

FACING THE FUTURE: SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES
OFFICER CORPS AND PROFESSIONALISM

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

FACING THE FUTURE: SLOVENIAN MILITARY OFFICER CORPS AND PROFESSIONALISM, by Captain Viktor Potocnik, 139 pages.

The topic of the thesis is profession of arms and the role of the officer corps in it. In particular, the thesis looks at the Slovenian Armed Forces Officer Corps. The topic was chosen because the answer to the question whether a military is able to face the challenges of the future lies in the level of professionalism of the officer corps. The primary research question is “What is the state of Slovenian Armed Forces Officer Corps professionalism and are changes necessary for the future?”

Thesis looks at the modern operational environment and what is expected of a profession of arms and professional officer in it. The thesis offers a definition of the profession of arms and professional military officer that are required to operate in a current and future operational environment. It also describes the main attributes of the military profession and professional.

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The main recommendations to address the problem are to adapt the existing legislature, to allow professionalism to develop, and to improve the officer educational system.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Research Questions.....	5
Definitions	5
Limitations.....	6
Scope and Delimitations	7
Significance of the Study.....	7
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
Theoretical Works.....	9
Contemporary Works.....	18
Slovenian Authors.....	30
Slovenian Strategic Documents	43
Surveys On Slovenian Armed Forces	52
Conclusion	55
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	64
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	66
Defining Profession of Arms and Professional Officer for 21st Century.....	66
A Postmodern Operational Environment.....	66
Profession of Arms	72
Professional Military Officers.....	73
What is expected of SAOC	76
Tasks	76
Operational Environment.....	78

Attributes of the Profession and Professional and their expression in SAOC	79
In Search of Jurisdictional Boundaries	79
Jurisdictional Boundaries and SAOC	81
Extensive Education Giving Expert Knowledge	82
Education and Expert Knowledge in SAOC.....	85
Relation of Trust and Service between the Officer Corps and Civil Society	92
Trust and Service in SAOC	95
Inner Organization Providing Autonomy	98
SAOC Inner Organization	99
Culture and Ethics: Linking Artifacts, Values and Underlying Assumptions.....	100
Artifacts in SAF	103
SAOC and SAF Values.....	104
SAOC and SAF underlying Assumptions	107
SAF Ethics	107
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	113
Conclusions.....	113
Recommendations.....	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY	122
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	129

ACRONYMS

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SAF	Slovenian Armed Forces
SAOC	Slovenian Armed Forces Officer Corps
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UN	United Nations
WWW	World Wide Web
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Professional officer	76
Figure 2. The teaching material based on the latest developments	86
Figure 3. Activity of the teaching faculty in their field of expertise	86
Figure 4. Command and Staff School organization	87

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. SAOC values.....	105

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine what makes a modern professional officer and what attributes does he possess. More specifically the purpose of the study is to examine the Slovenian Officer Corps and its professionalism as it faces the challenges of the 21st Century.

The U.S. military is currently in the midst of a review of its understanding of the profession of arms and professional military ethics. The central issue is that one cannot allow the attributes of military force professionalism to atrophy. If that is allowed the military is at risk of losing its expert knowledge and more importantly its society's trust. Without this trust, it is no longer able to perform, as a profession should. Therefore, it must periodically reexamine the foundations of its professionalism. This is especially true since there are fundamental changes detected in the values and interests of the society as a whole. These strongly influence the perceptions of what professionalism and professional ethics are and how they are to be applied. This, in turn, requires the military to reexamine its alignment and understanding of the profession with society. The question asked is how to approach the implementation of the required professional attributes so there is no discrepancy between what is desired and what is expressed.¹ The problems facing the U.S. military are common within democratic societies and their armed forces.

The Slovenian Officer Corps has traditionally been a part of a multi-national officer corps. The only exceptions to that rule were two short periods in 1918 and 1941 to 1945 when it lead a national force. On both occasions, it did not exist independently long

enough to develop a truly professional character unique to itself. It consisted of officers previously serving in a different military or hastily trained civilians with minimal leadership capabilities. After periods of independence, Slovenian officers were either demobilized or integrated into the strongest nation's multi-national force. Afterwards Slovenian Officer Corps professionalism became the same as for the dominant nationality of the officers in the country.

Prior to 1991, Slovenia did possess a national armed force. A Territorial Defense Force was de facto a Slovenian armed force within Yugoslavia. However, its NCO and officer leadership was schooled and indoctrinated in the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) educational system. Therefore, it cannot be spoken of as a truly independent force with its own professionalism. In addition, the Territorial Defense Force was a reserve force with only top leadership on active duty.

With its independence in 1991, Slovenia formed its own national armed forces out of the Territorial Defense Force with its own officer corps. Since the force, at the time, was mostly conscript and its focus national defense, the officer corps was developed focusing on training and leading a large conscript force for national defense. The officer corps was characterized by a strong diversity in background ranging from active YPA officers, including reserve and Territorial Defense Force officers, to recently commissioned civilians with no prior military education. The professionalism of such a diverse force was questionable in terms of shared values, ethics, expertise, and even loyalty.

In 2003, Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) underwent a quick and dramatic transformation from a conscript military to an all-volunteer military. The old divisions

between prior active YPA officers and reserve Territorial Defense Force officers, especially at the more senior levels, remained alive. As for the junior officers, commissioned since independence, their professionalism is a product of the circumstances in the military officer education system characterized by transformation, lack of expertise, and internal divisions at the senior levels. In 2004, Slovenia joined North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite joining NATO being a national goal for some time, its officer corps was not at the required professional level to cooperate with NATO counterparts. Although the force has undergone a dramatic structural and technological change in the years after NATO integration, the question of officer corps professionalism seems to remain unanswered.

The current SAF officers' background is, as stated, very diverse. It includes officers who attended the YPA Officer Academy (Army, Navy, and Air Force), those who have YPA Reserve Officer School training, the ones schooled exclusively in the SAF educational system, and a small number of those that are educated abroad in foreign officer academies or professional development courses. This in itself poses quite a significant professional challenge.

Although the senior SAF officers and their civilian leadership, in statements to the press and to the force continue to address the requirement for a highly professional force, one has problems identifying what exactly is meant by that. There is no document stating what kind of SAF professionalism is expected, nor can one find a record of a serious discussion on the SAF professionalism. In addition, in events leading to the independence of Slovenia and again in recent years, the debate within the civil society has come alive, suggesting that the SAF be disbanded or at least reduced to a token or protocol force.²

Observing the SAF in the recent years, one can observe two trends. First, a lot is done to implement NATO standards in terms of the organization of and equipping the force. Second, emphasis is placed on enlisted soldiers requirements and how they are to be treated as volunteers. That is understandable. The carrot of NATO membership has also come with the stick demanding the change in the force to make it comparable and interoperable with other NATO military.³ The move from a conscript to an all-volunteer military has resulted in the biggest change at the soldier level. At the same time, Non-Commissioned Officer and Officer Corps structure and professionalism was adjusted but not in essence changed.

The Slovenian Armed Forces have adapted their active and reserve structure to better reflect the nation's economic, social, and demographic capabilities, it also focused on the enlisted volunteer and his requirements. However, the officer corps seems to have been left in the dark. One could also argue that there has been a lot of change in the form but not a lot in content. If the nation is to have a truly functioning armed force, one that is capable and reliable, it will have to produce a professional officer corps. The implemented structural, organizational and human resources changes can only be sustained and brought into being with a professional officer corps. As Don M. Snider has suggested in his article in *The Future of the Military Profession* "Change how an officer corps thinks and you will change how an military behaves,"⁴ implying that one cannot change the thinking of the military if he does not first change the thinking of the officer corps. The SAF have undergone a dramatic change in the last seven years, fueled by political decisions and outside pressures. Its structure has been fundamentally changed

and its tasks have expanded. The question is; has the thinking in the officer corps changed accordingly? At the end of the day, its leaders shape the military's conduct.

Based on the above-mentioned reflections, the proposed thesis title is; "Facing the future: The Slovenian Armed Forces Officer Corps and Professionalism."

Research Questions

The primary question this thesis will answer is: What is the state of SAF Officer Corps professionalism and are changes necessary for the future? The question and its answer are significant since they could provide guidance for possible change in developing the SAF Officer Corps (SAOC) professionalism.

Secondary questions that will enable me to answer the primary questions are:

1. How are a contemporary profession of arms and a professional military officer defined? This question has further secondary questions. What is the modern military operational environment like? What attributes should a profession of arms and a professional officer have?

2. How is SAOC meeting the demands of a modern profession of arms? This question has the following secondary questions. What are the tasks and operational environment SAOC has to and will have to operate in? How are the attributes of the modern officer corps expressed in SAOC?

Definitions

Ethics. "Values, norms, and symbols regulating the behavior of the professional toward his client, public, and colleagues."⁵

Full Spectrum Operations. “Is the military’s operational concept where military forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an independent joint force to size, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.”⁶

Hybrid warfare. “Warfare that in addition to the employment of conventional tactics, also includes the use of terrorist, criminal and other irregular forms of warfare, information technologies and various economic resources.”⁷

Officer Corps. “Are commissioned officers imbued with a unique self-concept defined by the following four identities; warrior, member of profession, servant of country, leader of character.”⁸ “Officer Corps is a body or a group responsible for creating an intellectual consensus and direction that sets the professional standards which produce military effectiveness, and subsequently for policing and adapting these standards as necessary.”⁹

Profession. “A peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”¹⁰

Professionals. “They profess to know better than others the nature of certain matters, and to know better than their clients what ails them to their affairs.”¹¹

Limitations

The study will use a number of studies and surveys made by others on the values and attitudes of the SAF officers and assume that these sources reflect the actual conditions in SAOC.

Some strategic documents, such as the Defense Strategy and Mid-term Development Program (SOPR), will be published latter 2011, after the bulk of the

research is done. It is the author's assumption that they will not bring considerable new points that would make the analysis of this study invalid.

Scope and Delimitations

The part of the study that looks specifically at the officer corps in the SAF should not be considered applicable to the non-commissioned officer corps in the SAF nor to any other military officer corps.

The thesis uses the term "officer" and "he" in the generic sense for both female and male members of the profession.

Significance of the Study

The attempt of the study is to develop a basis for a discussion about the officer corps' professionalism in the SAF similar to the one ongoing in the U.S. military today. It will attempt to identify the gaps in the SAOC's professionalism and how to address them. It is the aim of the study to be used as a base for further research by other scholars interested in the SAF and for the SAF itself as it looks into developing its officer corps.

This chapter has established the research problem, why it is important, and the questions that will have to be answered in the process of research. The next chapter will deal with the relevant literature on the subject that will help answer the research questions.

¹Diltrice M. Thomas, "Exploring the Professional Military Ethic," *Foundation News*, no. 10 (Spring 2011): 15, 16.

²Urednistvo maldine, *Peticija Ukinimo vojsko* [Petition for abolishing military], Mladina Plus, http://www.mladina.si/mladina_plus/peticije/ukiniti_vojsko/ (accessed 28 July 2010).

³Christine Le Jeune, *New NATO Member States: The Benefits and Drawbacks of Enlargement* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2010), 8.

⁴Lloyd J. Matthews and Don M. Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 13.

⁵Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 63.

⁶U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Training and Doctrine Command, 2011), 3-1.

⁷National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolucija o Strategiji Nacionalne Varnosti Republike Slovenije* [Resolution on the national security strategy of the republic of Slovenia] (Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 18.

⁸Matthews and Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 9.

⁹Don M. Snider et al., *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 5.

¹⁰Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 7.

¹¹Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, 60.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is organized in the following manner. It first presents the basic works on theory of military professionalism offering some traditional definitions and its attributes. It then moves to the review of contemporary works spanning the last fifteen years and dealing with the question of what a modern officer corps should look like. This will provide a framework for examination of the modern military profession.

The next step in the literature review is to look into the case of Slovenia in particular. How it attempts to deal with the role of professionalism in the military and its officer corps. To accomplish this, the author will look at the formal documents describing the relationship between military and society in Slovenia, published articles concerning professionalism and officer corps in the SAF, as well as the results of research and surveys conducted on the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The literature review will examine the work of some prominent Slovenian scholars and top military leaders and their published thoughts as they apply to the SAOC professionalism. That will be done in order to define the general attributes of military profession as they apply to the SAOC.

Theoretical Works

Several well-known and publicized authors have written on the subject of professionalism of an officer corps in today's societies. They allow one to establish the required relationship between the policy makers and a professional officer corps in modern democratic societies as well as identify the required attributes of a professional officer corps.

David J. B. Trim offers a short historic review of military professionalism in his introduction to *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*. He argues that the medieval era is the origin of military professionalism. He suggests that there are seven markers of what we would today term professions: “a discrete occupational identity, formal hierarchy, permanence, a formal pay system, a distinctive expertise and means of education, efficiency in execution of expertise, and a distinctive self-conceptualization.” He argues that medieval times can offer all these distinctive qualities. The question is to what degree. As he says, “Indeed, it is likely that in the period 1400-1700 full military professionalism was never reached.” He does however imply that today’s professionalism can be traced to medieval times and that it has a lot in common with medieval chivalric ethos.¹

British General Sir John Hackett gives a historical overview on the development of an officer corps as a professional occupation in his 1983 work *The Profession of Arms*. He agrees with Janowitz that a modern military will have a more constabulary type role, rather than a conventional force on force role. It is of note that he puts special emphasis on professional officer education. He sees that as a major difference from other professions. In the medical and legal professions, individuals are required to undertake substantial initial training, after which they are certified to apply their knowledge. In contrast, initial military education will only prepare an individual to do the most basic tasks and he will later on have to continually revisit schools for extended periods of time to be able to progress in the profession.

He also points out the difference between “what to do” and “getting it done” leadership characteristics in commanders at different levels of the profession. He does

strongly support the participation of officers in civilian education institutions. He sees that as a way of minimizing the difficulty of reintegration into civilian life after retirement as well as maintaining the connection with it during the service. He warns heavily against industrial management techniques in the military as they can have a disastrous effect on unit coherence and officer professionalism. If not applied correctly and with deliberation, they could result in the breakdown of the military as in U.S. military during the Vietnam War. As he says at the end of his book “Principle of total engagement is fundamental to all of man’s more serious activities,” one can conclude that he believes that an officer should be totally engaged in his profession if he is to be a true professional.²

Samuel P. Huntington in his book, *The Soldier and the State*, writes primarily on the subject of the relation of the military to civilians in modern democratic western societies. He identifies two types of civilian control over the military: subjective and objective. Subjective control assumes “maximizing the political power over the military” while the objective control assumes “maximizing military professionalism.” He points out that in a democratic society the objective control should be the goal because it “reduces the military power to the lowest possible level while at the same time maximizes the level of military security.” However, “the political elites tend to prefer subjective control over the military since the latter allows them to subordinate the officer corps to their own interests and principles.” Huntington also defines the officer corps and its professional attributes as they relate to general professional attributes of any profession, those attributes being expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. He offers the five key institutions of the military profession; the requirements for entry into the

officer corps, the means of advancement within the officer corps, the character of the military educational system, the nature of the military staff system, and the general esprit and competence of the officer corps.³

In his 1964 work, *The Professional Soldier*, Morris Janowitz offers a social and political portrait of the U.S. professional soldier. He looks at him through career development, community, identity and ideology, and political behavior. He establishes that the military has moved from its combat roles back to what he claims has been its traditional role of a constabulary. From that, he offers us two types of officers “absolutists, who think in terms of traditional concepts of military victory,” and “pragmatists, who think of measured application of force and its political implications.” His professional characteristics unique to military profession are much like the one in Huntington’s work: military authority, special skill structure, officer recruitment, career patterns and political indoctrination. He also claims, “In the military profession . . . self-criticism is an essential prerequisite in effecting change . . . self-criticism must have significant intellectual content.”⁴

Bengt Abrahamsson, in his 1972 *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, disagrees with Huntington in as much as he claims that political neutrality in the officer corps cannot be achieved and, therefore, the objective control as described by Huntington is impossible. He claims that military men are not and cannot be neutral and objective servants of the state. He does however confirm professional expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are officer corps key attributes.⁵

In *The Professional Military Officer in a Changing Society*, Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, offers the following major characteristic of professions in general: organizational

structure, special knowledge and education, self-regulation, and calling and commitment. The U.S. military, according to him, falls into these four categories. However, it differs from other professions in each of these categories. He defines a professional as someone who “decides to stay in the military service beyond his immediate obligation.” He also provides a more realistic perspective on the military profession in pointing out that “military profession is a living entity made up of human beings.” As such, it cannot be divorced from politics, and has considerable inner political struggle. That however, is acceptable to a point, since it provides means of recognition and status not weeded in seniority. Of course, there is a threshold that cannot be crossed if one is to stay within the bounds of professional ethics.⁶

In 1995, *Soldiers, Society and National Security* Sam C. Sarkesian, John A. Williams, and Fred B. Brayant offer a brief overview of the theories on the military profession and set Huntington’s work as a theory that has stood the test of time. They then identify common characteristics of the military profession found in all the scholarly works. These characteristics are: a corporate-bureaucratic structure–system of rules and regulations and performance standards; requirement for special knowledge and education–skills needed not available to nonprofessionals and the need for continuing education unique to the profession; professional self-regulation–profession’s leaders determines entrance and promotion standards, adherence to professional standards and disciplinary agency; a sense of professional calling and commitment–serve regardless of financial remuneration, motivation by a sense of service to society. In all these characteristics, the training and education of officers are fundamental components of military profession.⁷

Martin Van Creveld, in *The Training of Officers*, offers a look different to the one in the West, at professional officer education in the post-cold war era. The author points out to a different approach in officer selection in Israel, Vietnam, and German military. In those countries officers are first selected based on their soldiering capabilities, and do not entrust the officer education prior to commission solely to civilian institutions. As the author argues “these results in officer-candidate examinations attracting an altogether different kind of person: a self-confident young soldiers.”⁸

Charles Moskos, in his 2000 article “Toward a Postmodern Military?” argues today’s military has entered a new period, that of a postmodern military as distinct from a 19th century military until the end of World War II, and late Cold War military. He goes on to say:

The postmodern military is characterized by three major organizational changes. One is the shift in military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The second is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. A final change is the growing use of the military in multinational forces and authorization (or at least legitimation) by entities beyond the nation-state.⁹

He goes on to describe this change by stating a few facts such as an initiative of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to establish a permanent military force for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The ending of a military draft in western societies, the advent of information technology as the “Revolution in Military Affairs” requiring large force reductions to finance the new technology, the emergence of private enterprise providing military training. Last, but not least, “postmodern motivation” of soldiers characterized by the desire for personal experience rather than national patriotism or occupational incentives.

Moskos argues the threat has always defined the relation between society and its military. Over time, threats are changing. Aggressions with conventional force or nuclear threats are no longer the primary threat in a postmodern world. Intrastate conflicts, terrorism (even nuclear) and (geo)economic interests characterize the threats today.

He also discusses what kind of a dominant military professional is needed in the postmodern world. It is no longer the warrior-leader or managerial technician, but rather a soldier-scholar and soldier-statesman. That is not to say that the other two are not needed, but rather what kind will prevail in military elite.

The public attitudes are also subject to change, and in a postmodern world before 9/11 in the U.S., it could be characterized as ambivalent. This is mainly because the general population has almost no contact with the military. In addition, the role of media has changed dramatically. Today we can speak of the so-called “CNN effect” where commanders can watch on television to see what goes on in their operational environments. Civilians have also taken prior military jobs deemed menial by the military, or jobs that require technical experts. Today’s modern western military and especially U.S. military could not operate without those civilians. He also argues that the traditional military values of honor, duty, and country are still valid; however, they are in a competition with the marketplace occupational incentives.¹⁰

Thomas Durell Young in his chapter “Military professionalism in a Democracy” discusses what constitutes military profession in a democracy. As he claims “There are key requisites that legitimate the use of force and violence in a democracy: force and violence are employed only in a rational way, for public purpose and with public consent.”

He bases his characteristics of the military profession on Huntington's expertise, responsibility, and corporateness adding essential duties to them. Expertise is required due to the complexity of the organizational structure of today's military as well as due to technological advances. Expertise is attained through education. In a democratic societies the military is responsible to democratically elected official and thus to the civil society. The moment an officer employs his skills for personal gain he is no longer the protector, but a criminal and threat to the society. Corporateness is a way of giving a profession special status while at the same time keeping it linked to the civil society. Democracies do this especially for officers in five ways: special requirements for entry, military educational system, clear promotion standards, establishment, education, and training of a professional military staff, and last honoring esprit de corps while preserving democratic values and respect for human rights within the military culture. When he talks of essential duties, he means areas of competence. The professional officer should be competent in managing organization, latest technological advances, training to standards, planning operations in the field, and in commanding and leading forces.¹¹

Young goes on to discuss the sources of tension in civil-military relations and how civil control over the military is exercised. He lists the following mechanisms of civilian control over the military in a democracy: limits on the size, mission, funds, legal limitations, culture of professionalism, societal norms, and free press.¹²

The western military is not the only one dealing with the question of professionalism. As Thomas J. Bickford and Kirsten A. Gunness state in *Civil-Military relations in Today's China*, China too has recognized the need for a more professional officer corps. The Chinese People's Liberation military (PLA) leadership, is aware of

professionalism importance in the force, and that PLA is behind other world powers in that respect. An article in *PLA Daily* recognized that at the beginning of the 20th century only 10 percent of the military power could be attributed to scientific advances, today, however, that ratio has gone up to 60 percent. The Chinese also recognize that the expertise cannot be purely military. In order to be able to compete and improve the professionalism of its officer corps PLA will have to utilize both civilian and military colleges.

The PLA interactions with civilian academic institutions have grown considerably since 1980s. It has increased the officer recruitment program in civil academic institutions. The PLA is also sending an increasing number of officers to civilian institutions for higher education. It is mainly interested in graduates from civilian natural sciences programs to fill positions in logistic and technology areas. In the latter, they are to be employed as technological advisors to combat troops.¹³

Joseph B. Rukanshagiza gives an interesting perspective on professionalism or lack of it in his dissertation, “African Armies: Understanding the origin and continuation of their Non-professionalism.” Although the African military cannot really be compared to those of the industrialized West, one can learn a lot from their experiences. As the author says, “Even if an African soldier possesses adequate expertise, a professional soldier is more than an individual with special skills acquired through intensive training.” African military forces are an example of how destructive for a nation a non-professional military can be. However, Africa’s problems are not just military but in essence political. Politics unable to give tasks and purpose to those military, but using them as a personal weapon is the problem’s essence.¹⁴

The works of theory mostly deal with civil-military relationship in a modern western society. To do that they address the questions of what professional military is and what characteristics it possesses. It can be said that the officer corps is a professional institution with professional attributes. It can also be deducted that the broad attributes of the military profession are the same as those in every other profession. As for the exact content of those attributes, different authors will emphasize different aspects.

Contemporary Works

The 1999 monograph by Dr. Don M. Snider, Major John A. Nagl, and Major Tony Pfaff entitled “Military Professionalism, the Military Ethics, and Officership in the 21st Century” suggests that a modern professional military, and especially its officer corps, are faced with challenges in all three components of military professionalism: military-technical, ethical, and political. They suggest, “the U.S. military’s norms of professional behavior are being corroded by political guidance on force protection.” However, the problem runs deeper. It is not policy that corrodes professional norms within the officer corps, but the conflict between personal and military ethics. They also address each of the military professional components in the light of that conflict. In the military-technical component, “society’s dissatisfaction with military profession is shown by interventions into spheres of expertise of military professionalism.”¹⁵

The ethical component poses the biggest problem. They claim the general population has rejected the idea of objective ethical truth, and since the officers come from that same society, they have a hard time aligning their personal ethics with that of the military. The military functions on the notion of objective truth. Without objective truth, everything is left to the desires and beliefs of individual leading to the belief “that

what is morally good is what is best for me.” This is a problem since the ethical obligations of the officers must be objective and not subject to any personal desires in order for them to perform their job in service to the society. Since they are responsible for society’s security, they must know and influence the private lives of soldiers, something that is unacceptable in civil occupations. Many officers cannot and do not resolve this dilemma, with objective truth usually on the losing end. That causes a problem because “officers than tend to perceive missions that do not comply with their perception of what constitutes the national interest as in fact immoral, and refuse to execute them as ordered.” By that, they are in conflict with the principle of civilian control, since the determination of the missions is a civilian and not a military job.¹⁶

In the political component, “the military can only retain legitimacy and standing in the society by successfully interacting with all political parties and opinions in the country.” It can therefore, not be considered apolitical as Huntington suggested. Since the U.S. military has, for the last three decades, been an all-volunteer military, the political leadership is more and more disconnected from the military culture and its contribution to the society. At the same time, the military leaders seem to be unwilling or unable to communicate this value to the public.¹⁷

In the authors’ opinion, the role of professional officers is to lead the change within the military that will “align the ethos within the military with that of the needs of the society.” Only officers motivated with a correct self-concept of who they are and what they must do can do that. The authors in the end offer a set of principles from which all officers should draw their vision and motivation.¹⁸

Martin L. Cook, in his 2004 book *The Moral Warrior* discusses the subject of ethics and service in the U.S. Military. As he point out U.S. military and especially its officer corps is more and more “Republican” in its politics. Characterized by an increasing part of the officer corps being “the product of military families,” and the fact that it is “unrepresentative of the society it serves.” At the same time, it remains the only true military superpower, technologically still without any serious competition in the world. This in itself presents challenges how to properly use those weapon systems. As the author suggests the military is today more than ever, faced with adversaries that do not take the form of a state.¹⁹

He addresses the question of service to the state. Officers seek moral justification for what they do, and they find it in the service to the state, for the common good. Service for the common good comes from “shared memory, common symbols, history and culture.” However, today’s world map does not correspond always to these shared common goods within many of the countries, for example, Bosnia and Somalia. The increased globalization has led us to the beginnings of the common world good and “it is the farsighted leadership that sees the need for a military dedicated to the high moral purpose of defending fellow citizens of the global common life.”²⁰

He examines the question of the nature of the military profession in the contemporary context. He argues that the type of tasks a military is asked to perform defines the professionalism, and in recent decades, those tasks have fundamentally changed, causing considerable stress in military professionalism.

Certainly, an element of military professionalism is to follow the legal orders of its superiors and to serve. However, that does not prevent independent thinking. Even

more, if the military is to be considered professional it has to possess professional intellectual independence, in order to be able to provide “professional military advice.” The main issue is “how the intellectual independence is properly exercised?” He argues that true intellectual independence is demonstrated when the military opposes society’s requests to perform something that is not within its professional expertise. “Simply serving society’s requests can never be an adequate definition of the obligation of any profession.”²¹

According to Cook, professional officership can be defined with the following four elements: professional; knowledge, cohesion, motivation, and identity. The changing circumstances in the global world demand a new set of skills and a different professional knowledge from the officer corps. It is hard for the traditional combat arms to accept this new body of knowledge, since their professional education has been centered on a different set of skills, morals, and heroes.

Professional cohesion “is how individuals identify with their profession and with their fellow members of the profession.” In the U.S. military, many studies have shown that there is a clear lack of common identification between generations of officers. “At their best, professions instill and express the sense that all members of the profession are part of a continuous professional link, linking the developing body of knowledge, expertise, and institutions through time.” Central to that notion is the process of mentorship. Senior officers’ mentoring and regularly providing open and honest feedback would improve the bonds of trust between superiors and subordinates.

The military does not set the terms of its social contract. As times change and nations’ needs change so does the nature of that contract. What needs to happen now is

for “the military officer corps to enthusiastically embrace the reality that the nation requires a different and more complex set of skills of its military today.”²²

Cook claims that military professionalism “must create and sustain the intellectual creativity to get ahead of environmental changes, to embrace them, and to demonstrate intellectual flexibility to inspire the nation’s confidence that it can meet the demands of the changing security environment with enthusiasm.”²³

The 2005 U.S. Army FM-1, *The Army* states the current military policy and understanding of the Profession of Arms. It states that “The purpose of any profession is to serve society by effectively delivering a necessary and useful specialized service.” In order to be professions, vocations must possess specialized knowledge, unique subculture, standards of conduct and codes of ethics. “In exchange for holding their membership to high technical and ethical standards, society grants professionals a great deal of autonomy.” The military profession, however, is different from other professions since it serves the collective client and not an individual; also, the consequences of failure in the profession of arms are potentially catastrophic for the entire society. One more thing differentiates the military profession from others, and that is the “unlimited liability”—only they can be ordered to place their lives in peril anywhere at any time.²⁴

FM-1 demands the leadership (officers and NCOs) to be professionally competent. It summarizes the competencies in shorthand expression, “BE-KNOW-DO.” To BE a leader one must possess the right character—the values and attributes that shape what the leader must be. KNOW constitutes skills the leader must possess—interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. Lastly, leadership is defined by action—the self-discipline to DO the right thing.²⁵

In 2005, Don M. Snider's and Lloyd J. Matthews's *The Future of Military Profession*, various authors tackle the issues of modern day U.S. military professionalism and the professionalism of the officer corps in particular. As General, Frederic M. Franks states in the foreword there was and still is "the sense that there is discrepancy between what military says it is and what is it proving to be in practice."²⁶

The authors believed that the traditional characteristics of a profession were no longer enough to describe the modern military profession. Therefore, they turned to sociologist Professor Andrew Abbott and his study, *The System of Professions*, to update the military professionalism's basic characteristics. That is not to say that "the traditional characteristics are no longer applicable, rather the new ones supplement them." The characteristics now being; application of abstract knowledge, organization of occupation, extensive education of its members, service to society, shared ethics, a legitimate claim to apply expert knowledge to a particular set of tasks (jurisdiction), operating in the system of professions where professions compete for the control of the work. The book then offers nine conclusions on the state of U.S. military professionalism, and how those conclusions have changed from 2000 to 2004.²⁷

The authors discuss the multiple identities of a professional military officer, and how important professional military ethics is to the modern officer corps. It is the foundation from which the norms and behaviors spring, and the trust with civilian society is formed. The professional officer corps had four identities: warrior, leader of character, servant, and member of a profession of arms. They also identify the main virtues of professional officers as selflessness, courage, prudence, caring, and integrity. Sometimes the four identities can be in conflict with each other, but in that case, it is the virtues that

should solve the dilemma. That, however, can only be achieved if the officers practice what they preach. In other words, knowing and doing is not enough. Being is also necessary. To be a true profession two conditions must be met. First “military culture must reflect professed values,” and second “individual values must be compatible with military values.”²⁸

The book is clear in its suggestion that the professionalism of the service members has changed dramatically in the last decade, and that the change has been mostly for the better. However, the post-cold war environment of uncertainty demands officers who are psychologically mature at more junior levels. The authors clearly single out the officer corps as the group within military professionals that will need to lead the changing profession both legally and morally.²⁹

Don M. Snider, Suzanne C. Nielsen, and others in their 2009 *American Civil-Military Relations: The Solider and the State in a New Era* reexamine the nature of civil-military relations in the U.S. They address the issue of professionalism in the twenty-first Century. The twenty-first century world “will look more like the pre-Westphalia world,” and will demand cultural, historical, linguistic, and political knowledge in the use of military power. That is not to say tactical and operational competence will not be important, but rather that they will no longer be the sole deciding factor in military efficiency. Military professional education becomes of critical importance in preparing officers for the new challenges. As long as the professional education in a career of an officer is not seen as important as the job of an executive officer or a commander, one cannot expect to have developed a truly professional officer corps for the 21st century.

Today's military must incorporate stability operations into the profession. They are a critical component in winning modern wars. The military cannot expect other elements of government to "step up to resolve the problem," although other government agencies will continue to play an important role in stability operations. Therefore, the military is faced with considerable conceptual, educational, organizational, and integration challenges if it is to make its role in stability operations effective. Continued adherence to Huntington's formulation of military profession is no longer valid. It was "steeped in a cold war context," and can no longer address the challenges of today's armed forces.³⁰

Responsible obedience by military professionals states that they must accept moral responsibility for their actions. They cannot be, as Huntington suggested "a morally neutral instrument of violence obedient to the state." Moral responsibility is not and cannot be a sole problem for the political leader. Application of the expert knowledge requires the military professional to exercise "discretion in what they do and how they do it." However, that does not mean that they can do as they like. The exercise of their professional discretion can only happen within the boundaries of "the constitutional design." This responsible obedience and associated moral reasoning can be taught at military schools, but it must also be "augmented by an institutional climate within which moral reasoning is taken seriously."³¹

Conceptions of the military professions boundaries are changing from Huntington's officer-centric, through Moskos institutional-occupational model to today's discussion of the Total Force. The formulation of boundaries is important as society privileges are linked to the membership in a profession. Any expansion of who should be

included in the military profession would affect these privileges. It is not yet clear whether the non-commissioned officers, civilians, and reservists should be included in the definition of the profession. The authors believe they should be, and that is what would make the force “meet the professional standards to which it is held, and the military more effective.”³²

The latest 2010 Training and Doctrine Command, *White Paper on Profession of Arms*, discusses the role of the officer and profession of arms in the U.S. military in twenty-first century. It defines the profession of arms and the professional soldier. The Profession of Arms is defined as “a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.” The professional soldier is defined as “an expert, a volunteer certified in the Profession of Arms, bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the military profession.” It identifies military leadership as the one responsible for establishing the key components of these definitions. They need to establish “a professional identity and culture rather than one of government occupation.”³³

The White Paper then establishes the key attributes of the Profession of Arms, all of which must be developed at both the institutional and individual level. Expertise is manifested in the skill of the individual, trust with the client is the most important attribute, development of the military through right leadership at all levels, values-culture which creates the right character of the individual, and service to the society which is manifested in the duty of the individual professional.³⁴

Professional expertise is grouped into four fields: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. All of them enable the military to employ ethical combat power and enable it to have appropriate operational adaptability. This expertise goes beyond pure knowledge, to include motivation, culture and climate, and system management. Trust is at the heart of the Profession of Arms. “True professionals control their own work,” but that can only be done if the professionals show the “right moral character and the ability to reason effectively in moral frameworks,” expected from it by the client-the society. How much the society trusts the military professional is shown by how much autonomy it allows them. The military leadership is responsible for professional development, especially the strategic leaders; the sergeants major, colonels, and general officers. “Their every action influences all five key attributes of the profession, the four fields of expertise, and has considerable impact on culture and climate of the military.”³⁵

The White Paper states that the military’s culture gives its soldiers a guide as to “how things are done around here.” This is far more important than all the written and codified rules. It underlines the climate in the organization and the value system that drives that climate. Military culture is shown on three levels; artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions. Artifacts are at the surface. “They are what can be seen, heard, or be aware of when operating in the military. Espoused beliefs and values are what the military says is important, the codified rules.” This can pose a problem when the espoused values are different to the ones in use. It can create confusion and “lead to dysfunctional and demoralizing behavior.” At the deepest level of culture, there are basic underlying assumptions. They are “the solutions that have repeatedly

shown themselves as useful and become taken for granted so that no one questions them.”³⁶

At the core of the military culture are military ethics. The moral complexities of the military’s lethality in the modern operational environment, requires strong moral character and ethos at all levels. Ethics answers the questions of “why and how the military fights and it is up to the leaders to teach these principles to the soldiers and to communicate them to the society.” Ethics itself must serve three purposes: “establish guidelines for moral judgments, inform operational design and mission command, and provide standards and framework for the development of soldiers’ character.” If the written or espoused values are not expressed in action, they are meaningless. Leaders at all levels set the conditions for an ethical culture by “rewarding ethical and punishing unethical behavior.” They can also create normative pressures to align ethical behavior, and to serve as the most powerful role models. The way they do business is the way the military culture is going to be.³⁷

The White Paper lastly deals with the civil-military relations and service to the society and the duty of the military professional. Because unique perspectives make military input vital in formulating laws and policies of the nation, in regards to its security, it is the moral duty of military leaders to provide their perspective in appropriate forums, while at the same time do that in proper manner, respectfully and as advice not advocacy. “The military’s first obligation is to do no harm to the democratic institutions.”³⁸

James G. Pierce, in *Is Organizational Culture of the U.S. Military Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?*, looks at organizational

culture and professionalism in the U.S. military. He suggests, “There is a lack of congruence between the U.S. military professional culture and the professional development programs.” He also claims that his study “has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. military and the professional managerial-leadership skills of its senior level leaders.”³⁹

In defining military professionalism and professional development, he does not offer anything significantly new. He recaptures the work of earlier authors, such as Huntington, Abbot, Freidson, Snider, Cook, and others, and applies it to the specific situation in the U.S. military. However, he does reemphasize the importance of the organizational culture as the foundation upon which all other elements of professionalism are built, as described when describing professional behavior in U.S. Army FM 22-100.⁴⁰

Peter Olsthoorn in his 2011 *Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st century*, claims that the western way of war has in recent decades fundamentally changed by the numerous restraints it imposes on its soldiers, with the aim to “occupy the moral high ground” over their adversaries. The author also argues that there seems to be a lot of concern within the military that the prevailing values of individualism and materialism, in the civil society, might have eventually disastrous consequences for the military’s social fabric. The military also seems to think that it is somehow a “moral beacon to society as it possesses a higher caliber of virtue” than the average civilian. However, he also points out that the notion of moral superiority of the military is somehow false, especially taking into account the number of civilian casualties in recent conflicts, the possibility of terrorists being produced by the military presence in various countries, and the specific treatment of local populations by military personnel.

Olsthoorn, in more detail, examines the notions of honor, courage, loyalty, integrity, and respect as traditional components of military ethics.⁴¹

Slovenian Authors

Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, the current Defense Minister and a Professor at the Department for Defense Studies on the Faculty for Social Studies, wrote on military professionalism in her 1997 book, *Legitimnost Sodobnega Vojaštva* [Legitimacy of Modern Soldiery]. As the title suggests, the book is mainly concerned with how the military legitimizes itself in modern Western society. It examines the basis of civil military relations, and how they are formed particularly in Slovenia. Several chapters in the book address the Profession of Arms, its characteristics, and what military professionalism means for Slovenian national security.⁴²

Dr. Jelusic agrees with Abrahamson in defining the three main characteristics of any professionalism as corporativeness, special knowledge, and norms-ethics. She also goes on to establish that there are two main schools of thought on military professionalism. The American structural model looks at military professionalism in terms of specific characteristics that make it different from all other professions. The European process model, on the other hand, examines the relationship between the officer profession and the process of professionalization. She also states that we can only talk of professionalism when we talk about military officers because only they display all the necessary characteristics. When we consider Non-Commissioned Officers and enlisted soldiers, we can only speak of a specialized occupation and not of a profession.⁴³

Dr. Jelusic lists and examines nine characteristics of the Profession of Arms. These characteristics being expertise, professional autonomy, officer responsibility, the

user concept, corporativeness, the concept of unlimited service, community sanctions, professional culture, and professional authority.⁴⁴

Later on, the book examines the Slovenian Armed Forces professionalism and how Slovenian society sees the role and functions of the military based on empirical research conducted among the population and members of SAF. Dr. Jelusic recognizes the fact that the SAOC, at the time, is still very diverse in terms of recruitment background, professional knowledge, military culture, and professional ethics in particular. This officer corps needs to be uniformed to properly function in service to the society. According to the book, to achieve true professionalism in the eyes of the public, the SAF will have to improve its public communication, prove that its members are in possession of specialized knowledge that no one else possesses, have a developed and functioning ethical code, and establish that it provides a function essential for the existence of society.⁴⁵

The education of military professionals in the Slovenian society must address several issues. The very existence of the military must be addressed. People find it harder and harder to understand why the military is needed in a world where they do not see any immediate or even mid-term military threats. One can also still find the fear of militarization in society. Most of it is based on the negative historical experience, with the YPA. Therefore, the military education system has to address all of this. Its primary role is to provide a uniform set of professional skills and enough knowledge for the officers to do their job in a professional manner. At the same time, it should provide an education that will allow the easy transfer of officers into civil society. Due to the size of the SAF, all officers cannot be expected to spend their whole careers in the military and

should, at some point, be able to transfer to civil society. At the same time, this would provide more integration into the civil society and therefore reduce the level of fear of military intervention in civil society.

The book also examines how Slovenians see the SAF functions in their society. Based on public opinion research, one can establish that the two primary SAF function in the eyes of the public are to deter military aggression and to participate in relief efforts during natural or other disasters in the country. However, the SAF should not have any internal role in terms of influencing politics or even in educating young men in patriotism. The latter obviously being strongly influenced by the experiences with YPA.

It also analyses the type of military professional that is desired among the members of the Slovenian Armed Forces, which at the time of the research was still Territorial Defense Force. It points out two distinct roles the officer should play, the role of manager, and the role of hero. These may seem incompatible at first, but it is pointed out that during peacetime the members of the SAF were looking more towards the director-manager type of leaders, while during a war they expect more of a hero, teammate, and father type of leaders.⁴⁶

Challenges facing the future of the SAOC are to some extent discussed in the articles found in SAF professional publication called “Bilten Slovenske vojske-Sodobni vojaski izivi.”⁴⁷

The following from Brigadier Furlan Branimir, the current SAF Force Commander, article in November 2008 titled “Strategic political Guidelines for the Operations and Development of Slovenian Armed Forces,” states all strategic military documents and all of its manuals are approved by the civilian authorities, namely the

Minister of Defense. He also goes to establish that while the strategic political guidance is hierarchical in nature and all encompassing, they are uncoordinated in content and do not reflect the current political-security environment.⁴⁸

Dr. Ljubica Jelusic in her article “How can Defense Studies Contribute to a Greater Professionalism of SAF Officers—a Discussion,” points out that *Jane’s Sentinel* magazine claims two-thirds of SAF officers are under qualified. She claims that analysis must be done into which SAOC elements contribute the most to the evaluation of under qualification. As she analyses SAF officer education system, she points out that a lot of energy seems to be invested in improving officer education at the highest level, indicating that the focus of the SAF professional development seems to rest in field grade and general officers. However, according to her, that is in stark contrast to the fact that Slovenia is not capable of providing requirements (and sometimes demands) for field grade officers at international military headquarters. She concludes by stating that the SAF education system seems to “meet the promotion requirements, and not at the same time the knowledge, experience, and competence requirements for international headquarters.”⁴⁹

She goes on to establish that there are many ideas as to how to form professional military education in SAF, but “the authors are mainly dealing with form and not the content.” She also says, “Expertise in SAF only goes to the level of form (subject), but it does not have the knowledge to define the content of that form.” She is also critical of how the SAF performs officer candidate selection through awarding scholarships, effectively preventing the Defense Studies graduates to be considered for selection. In addition, the SAF has clearly taken the path of skill over expert knowledge and

education, by choosing to commission officers from non-commissioned officer ranks. It is clear to her that officers with minimal operational experience cannot estimate what kind of officer is needed, or what expertise he should possess.⁵⁰

She concludes by stating that the “answers to what kind of expertise are needed for SAF officers are to be found within operational units and among those officers who have worked and participated in international operations and headquarters.”⁵¹

Dr. Igor Kotnik, professor at the Faculty for Social Studies in Ljubljana, states in his May 2008 article “A Modern Officer of the Slovenian Armed Forces: Their Characteristics and Formation,” two key questions that are not yet answered in Slovenia and the SAF. In what kind of operations is the SAF officer expected to operate and what is he supposed to be like? He points out that developed industrial nations in the world have new types of tasks and new expectations for their officers. Slovenia considers itself a part of this group of nations and should be concerned with the same challenges. As a model to be imitated, Kotnik suggests U.S. military Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) program.⁵²

He sees a modern officer as the “one that is able to at the same time employ combat and diplomatic skills, while having the ability to assess situations not only in terms of military results but also political, linguistic, cultural, religious and other implications.” As he points out in the article, a modern nation needs an expert and professional officer corps, and not officers who seek only short-term material benefits in participating in peacekeeping operations. Professional officer characteristics span the spectrum from “being bureaucratic to an effective problem solver.” He also believes

modern professional officers “must be active in national security development processes. Not as politicians, but as experts on national security.”⁵³

As he analyses the SAF officer education system, he points out that one can see personal and partial interests taking over from the national security interests. He believes having an independent military educational institution not incorporated into civilian educational system is a mistake and an unnecessary waste of resources. The SAF Training and Doctrine Command can be and must be a center of military expertise, but the SAF on its own cannot and will not be able to produce appropriate modern officer professionals. He also points out that one of the least transparent, and from an ethical point of view, most problematic areas in SAF is the career system and promotion. He also claims that a major deficiency and challenge for the SAF is to provide a suitable value-ethics base for its officer corps. He goes on by saying that:

One has to understand that good officers are not made in schools. During education, they get the necessary theoretical knowledge, which is then tested, supplemented and upgraded during the long process of “grinding” and “maturation” in military organizations, through getting experiences working with units, and especially in executing tasks in various military operations.

He concludes by saying “Looking long term at nation’s military, its quality, and the quality of its officer corps is always a reflection of the quality of its politics and politicians.”⁵⁴

Another Professor and former YPA Naval officer, Dr. Anton Zabkar in his article “The Achilles Heels of the Education System for SAF Officer Candidates—A Discussion,” states several interesting things. He criticizes the overlapping use of the terms occupation and professional⁵⁵ in Slovenian politics and in public. Implying that there is no real discussion or agreement on what the Profession of Arms is in Slovenia.

He also criticizes the constant public statements of politicians, and especially senior military officers, on how very professional the members of SAF are without any metric or any other type of analysis that might actually corroborate the claim. He goes further and claims that the real situation is quite the opposite if one studies independent foreign reports on the level of SAOC's professionalism, which claim that as much as 70 percent of the SAOC is under qualified for the job they perform. Here he coincides with Jelusic Ljubica and her article. He gives his own definition of what an military professional is "only a member of the armed forces, who has a contract with the state, based on the appropriate military knowledge in the fields of leadership and the use of units (strategy, operations, tactics), he acquired during graduate or postgraduate studies, and went through a very strict selection system."⁵⁶

Anton Zabkar coauthors with Uros Svete in an article, "Educating Military Professionals: Between Traditional Starts and (Post) Modern Challenges." In it, the authors examine the requirements, structure, content, results, and faculty of SAF officer educational system and compare it to Belgian and U.S. systems. They point out severe deficiencies in the officer education system and list several reasons for them. The first was a successful Territorial Defense System based on mass and non-professionalism, which enabled independence in 1991 and later caused skepticism as to the need for a professional officer education system. The second was the lack of military educational infrastructure in Slovenia, causing it to be built from scratch. The third is the lack of interest in Slovenian political and academic elite have for a professional officer corps comparable to other European countries. They claim that the structure and the content of the officer schools at all levels are inappropriate, and are a training and not an education

centric. They do not follow the modern educational trends and are not compatible with the civil educational system. In addition, they point out that the SAF does not have the faculty necessary to teach military sciences. The development of it will not only require the currently non-existent “faculty selection criteria, but above all time.”⁵⁷

Liliana Brozic and Dusan Susnik, in their article, “Education Process Evaluation with Emphasis on Military Contents,” present part of the results of a survey that was conducted in the SAF Command and Staff School, specifically in the Higher Staff School. In a survey, the participants were asked to evaluate the currency of literature they were given and to evaluate how active members of the teaching faculty are, in terms of writing and publishing in their area of expertise. In the survey, participants were comparing the teaching faculty and literature from the Command and Staff School versus the ones from associated civilian faculties: the Faculty for Social Sciences, the Management Faculty, and the Faculty for Logistics. The survey clearly shows there is a gap between the military and the civilians, in favor of civilian literature and the teaching faculty.⁵⁸

On the other hand, Colonel Stojan Zabukovec in his article, “Development of Advanced Military Education and Training of SAF Officer Candidates and a Comparison with Other Countries,” claims that the officer educational system in SAF is comparable to those in the U.S., Belgium, and Sweden. There are, of course, some differences, but they are logical as these military operate in different environments. He claims that the SAF officer education system still has room to improve but it is on the right track, and produces well-educated professional officers.⁵⁹

Captain (N) Ljubo Poles in his article, “Concept of Military Education and Training of SAF Officer Candidates: Present and Future,” argues for an independent higher education institute for SAF. Only through it can the SAF establish a professional body of knowledge that will ensure the appropriate “recognition to the profession of an officer” in Slovenian society. It would also allow for the development of subject matter experts that cannot be acquired through the conventional civilian educational system.

Poles argues that the belief that the SAF educational system should provide an officer with the knowledge that will allow him to function in a civil society once he leaves the military is inappropriate. By itself, the idea is not wrong. However, the goal of the SAF educational system should be to form a professional officer and provide him with the education that will “allow him to successfully perform his tasks and improve the organization.” He argues, “Individuals leaving the military and their integration into civil society are very important, but they cannot be the most important element” in deciding how to format the officer education system.⁶⁰

Lt.Colonel Dusan Tos in his article, “Military Education System: Reality or Short-lived Solution,” argues that the SAF officer education system is the best possible under current circumstances. He also distinguishes between two types of officers: a career officer who performs his duties exclusively within the defense system, and officers who have, in addition to a civil expertise and military skills and knowledge, linked to their civil expertise.

He also provides attributes a modern officer should have such as being independent, able to understand the social environment he operates in, having skills to

communicate with the general public, understanding new technology and information technologies, being a leader, and indoctrinated in service to the state.

He also argues, “Western military officers are skill oriented, while Central and Eastern Europe officers are more scientific.” With that he is implying that European military value professional education more than U.S. military. However, no matter what kind of officer is being sought, he argues that for a professional officer, at whatever level, education is the most important attribute. “Only patriotic and military education, linked with military expertise and general knowledge, allow for a winning combination of a modern officer.”⁶¹

A researcher of politics and public administration at the Faculty for Social Sciences in Ljubljana, Lea Smerkolj, in her 2010 article “Comparative Analysis of Salary Systems of Armed Forces Members,” states the fact that SAF members are legally considered public employees and that the legislature does not take into account the special circumstances typical only to the defense area. As she analyses several other European NATO countries, she compares how the status of armed forces is solved in those countries.

According to her, there have been warnings coming from the senior SAF leadership that the status of public employees for military personnel is not an appropriate solution. However, as she points out in her article, the argument is not so much about the SAF capabilities limitations due to the current status, as it is about the salary amount.⁶²

Mojca Grasic, an officer in SAF, in her article “Basic Education for Officers,” argues that the Slovenian society has not yet decided whether it wants or needs professional military officers. She also argues that officers have to be able to participate

in a work-force market, and should be educated accordingly. She recognizes the need to have well educated, trained, and informed individuals as professional officers. She says, “Officers are the holders of theoretical knowledge and professionalism in military.” She also argues that critical requirements for professional officers today allow them to be able to act independently even at the lowest tactical levels. They should have an understanding of the social environment, be able to communicate with the general public and to have an understanding of existing and emerging technologies. She is more specific when she says that an officer needs to have the knowledge “to manage assets, not to maintain or develop them; to command units in complex social environments, not just understand society; to organize and lead people, not just know people and management.” A Slovenian officer, according to her, has to be a reflection of Slovenian society, formed based on common values, and an understanding of social dynamics.⁶³

Major Ernest Pleh outlines the officer selection program for SAF in his article, “Postopek Pridobivanja Castniskega Kadra v Slovenski Vojsk.” The selection itself consists of physical fitness, swimming, psychological, military skills, and endurance test, and behavior monitoring under stress.⁶⁴

Major Boris Bratusek, in his article, “Career and Military Education,” claims that SAF education and training “supports individual career development, by allowing him to gradually acquire knowledge and skills.” He sees two distinct groups among SAF members. Those who intend to make the SAF a career, and others who will be temporally employed.⁶⁵

Dr. Mainca Jakic was an adviser to the SAF Chief of General Staff and is now employed by the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology. Her research is

more in detail examined later. She published two articles in “Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin.” As the titles of her articles suggest, “Social Perceptions Connected with Military Leadership in Slovenian Armed Forces” and “Values and perceptions Regarding The Realization Of Military Values Of Slovenian Armed Forces Members,” her research focused on the social aspect of the SAF.

In the first article, she establishes what SAF members believe the properties of a good leader are. They are, in order of importance, responsibility, taking care of subordinates, professional attitude, and expertise. She also analyses how satisfied the SAF members are with their leadership. She concludes by establishing the fact that SAF members have similar expectations of their leaders as do their counterparts in the U.S. military. However, based on her analysis she claims, “in the field of leadership in SAF, some effort will have to be made to improve it.”⁶⁶

The second article deals with SAF members’ values. She recognizes that the social values in modern industrialized nations have changed and that the military will have to consider these changes. As her research shows, the most important values for SAF officers are honesty, respect, camaraderie, honor, loyalty, and dedication. Courage ranks seventh and patriotism tenth. However, the latter is determined by SAF “Military Doctrine” as the most important and underlying value for its members.⁶⁷ She evaluates the SAF organizational culture as positive. As she says, “we can see we have motivated individuals, seeking an “ideal” organization and as a consequence a good organizational culture.”⁶⁸

In his interview “Prikrajsana dvajsetletnica [Deprived twenties anniversary]” Colonel Ivan Mikuz, chief of long-term planning at the SAF General Staff, provides an

insight into current SAF environment. The SAF has been in a permanent state of reorganization for the last twenty years. According to Colonel Mikuz, SAF is training to conduct a defense of the Slovenian territory, although “such plans are now also a matter of alliance, as we are a part of the collective security system.” He also talks about the SAOC educational level and states that “at the moment there are 1200 officers with a higher education level than is needed for their position. When they enroll into Staff School, they usually already have a master’s degree or at least two specializations. The SAF has 18 Ph.Ds.” In addition, “working in joint NATO structures is no longer an individual wish, but a necessary requirement if an officer wants to be promoted.” To understand future warfare, the SAF invests in officer education abroad as well as looking into the experiences of its officers and units being deployed around the globe.⁶⁹

The former SAF General Staff Chief, General Iztok Podbregar, in his article “Talka kampanjskega odnosa politike [Hostage to politics]” looks at the current SAF affairs. As he sees it, Slovenian politics is using the SAF for its personal interests, and has done nothing to face the needs of its development in service to the society. He also criticizes the level of motivation and discipline among the ranks and officer corps and claims, “The SAF is operating as a bureaucratic and inflexible public service agency.” He does however, recognize the efforts it is putting into its international obligations but those most of the time go unnoticed due to the small size of otherwise efficient force. As far as the officer educational system is concerned, he points to the fact that it lacks integration into civilian structures and is starting to fall behind other European military.⁷⁰

In his interview with Dejan Karba, Major General (retired) Janez Slapar comments on the current state of affairs in the SAF. According to him, Slovenia does not

need a ten thousand strong force. A mere four thousand would be enough for NATO. He recognizes that the SAF has been a hostage and victim of Slovenian politics. He claims there are not enough generals in the SAF and that that is the main reason why it cannot accept offered positions in international organizations like the UN and NATO. According to General Slapar, the SAF has copied too much from foreign military sources, especially U.S. military. There is not enough “Slovenian military soul” in the SAF. He also claims the SAF has copied lack of concern for soldiers from U.S. Military.⁷¹

Slovenian Strategic Documents

Slovenian national security documents and military doctrinal documents identify the challenges the SAOC faces in the future.

The *Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia* addresses defense in several articles directly or indirectly. Article 92 states that National Assembly decides on the use of armed forces. Article 123 states that the state’s defense is obligatory in ways and scope prescribed by Law, and that citizens who are unwilling to perform military duties due to their principles must be allowed to serve in some other way. Article 124 states that a law implemented by National Assembly “defines the type, scope, and organization of the territorial inviolability and integrity of the state.” The defense execution is subject to National Assembly control and that in order to provide security the state “uses primarily the policy of peace, and culture of peace and nonviolence.”⁷² The Constitution provides the basis for the Slovenian Defense Act.

The 2004 *Defense Act*, in Article 2, states the primary purpose of defense is the deterrence of an attack and the state’s “defense of the independence, inviolability and integrity.” It also declares that this can also be achieved by joining an active participation

in international alliances. The responsibility for the military part of defense is in Article 3 entrusted to the SAF. Article 37 then lists all the tasks the military is supposed to execute: the armed forces education and training, maintain the appropriate level of readiness, defend if the country is attacked, participate in civil defense, execute international obligations. It also states that the military cannot be used for political or any individual political party purposes. The scope of civilian control over the military is evident from Article 42, which deals with leading the military. The Minister of Defense, according to Article 42, not only leads the military but, directs its development and organization, provides guidance and decides on training programs, military professional literature, regulations, and matters of organization and work. Article 49, states the oath for all SAF members regardless of rank. Through “The Oath,” the SAF members swear that they “will defend autonomy, independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the Republic and conduct their service in the defense in a conscientious and responsible manner.”⁷³ Article 44 covers the responsibilities of commanders. It also delegates responsibility to approve the long-term development and equipping of forces plans to the National Assembly.⁷⁴

The 2007 *Service in the Slovenian Military Act* does not change the military’s role and mission. It does however, in detail outline the service of SAF members and units abroad and within alliances. It also sets the conditions for the so called “comprehensive care” of the SAF members.⁷⁵

The two Acts address the military tasks and the environment it is supposed to operate in—a multinational environment. They also identify the roles the senior leadership

will have to perform in support of those tasks and the relationship of the military to civil society.

In 2009, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia conducted a strategic review of the defense sector. The findings were then published in *Strategic Review of Defense Sector 2009 (SRDS)–Summary of key SRDS 2009 conclusions for communication with the interested public*. The document reviews the entire defense sector in Slovenia.

SRDS confirms that there are several inconsistencies in various strategic defense documents. The number of officers in the SAF was supposed to decrease but has in fact, increased. It also recognizes that there is a need to balance the number of high-ranking officers with the new SAF structure. It also establishes the fact that the SAF is oversized in terms of number of commands, number of barracks and unbalanced organizational structure. In addition, a need exists to improve the SAF's functional professionalism. Therefore, the area of personnel will have to be consolidated. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, it recognizes that there is a problem in the selection process for positions within the military education system. It implies that the personnel conducting military education and training must be carefully selected.

As it looks into starting points for the SAF development, it establishes some basic assumptions. The SAF is primarily a land force with limited components of sea and air power. It will not develop certain other capabilities, but will rely on alliances and bilateral agreements to provide them. The SAF will organize brigade size combined arms units for national defense and battalion size combined arms forces to employ abroad. SAF joint operations will only be conducted within alliances.

The SRDS also recognizes the necessity to remove SAF members from the public employees system, due to the nature of service in the SAF. Thus recognizes that the military professional cannot be regarded as a bureaucratic public servant.

As for personnel, the SRDS demands that the system of recruitment and education be revised and entrance and exit criteria be reviewed, so that the system will allow more flexibility in the personnel structure.⁷⁶

The 2010 *Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia* provides a list of the Republic of Slovenia national interests and its national security objectives. It deals with the geopolitical and geostrategic position of the country and sources of threats and risks to national security. It also lists the ways Slovenia is going to respond to those threats and risks and, in very broad terms, what means it has available.

As for national security objectives, the “Resolution” indicates a high degree of security for the country, a strong and stable international political and security status, peace-keeping and the strengthening of the security and stability of the international community and others. In terms of threat and risk sources, the “Resolution” reviews risks from global, transnational, and national sources. For the use of this study, the sources of threat were limited to those that have elements of military security attached to them. Crisis regions are one of them. The “Resolution” states that Slovenia is faced with geographically distant regional crisis regions. It lists terrorism as one of the greatest security threats in the world however, it sees it as posing a relatively low threat to Slovenia at present. The short-term and midterm military threat is assessed as low, but the need to be prepared to face it in the long term is stressed. The military threat, according to the “Resolution,” could come from land, air, sea, cyber space, and space. According to

the “Resolution,” the dangers coming from hybrid threat are the only ones that pose a serious military threat to the members of SAF in its current operations abroad and at home.⁷⁷

Slovenia will participate in international operations in accordance with its capabilities, available resources and national interests. The focus of her participation will be in European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions, particularly in areas directly affecting national security. These areas are Southeast Europe, North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia. However, Slovenia does not intend to use only military forces in those operations. It will rather take on a more comprehensive approach, which includes civil-military cooperation, cooperation of international institutions and non-governmental organizations.⁷⁸

The SAF is the promoter of military defense and the development of military capabilities within the National Security System of the Republic of Slovenia. For the military to be able to conduct its assigned missions at home and abroad it needs to maintain the appropriate level of preparedness. It needs to be able to operate in a multinational environment in both the conventional and asymmetric fight, and needs to have the equipment that will provide the best possible protection to the users and the appropriate level of interoperability. It will be developed in accordance with mid-term and long-term plans and adopt NATO Force Goals. In its development, the priority will be given to development of capabilities to conduct the military defense of the country, military contributions to international security, cooperation in protection and rescue activities and support to other state agencies in providing security.⁷⁹ As far as the update

to the latest “Resolution” is concerned, the National Assembly has the authority to assess its implementation and to supplement it as necessary.⁸⁰

One can conclude that the “Resolution” addressed the threats posed to national security. The military threat is assessed as low and, therefore, the role of the military and the tasks it has to perform are adapted accordingly. Two major points important for this study come out of the “Resolution”. First, the professional military service members are required to operate in multinational environment abroad, in short and mid-term. Second, the service members are required to operate in multi-agency environment, and perform nonmilitary tasks in support of security at home.

In December 2010, the National Assembly adopted a new *Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025*.

The “Resolution 2025” recognizes that nation’s resources are limited and will remain limited to 2025. However, that should not stop the SAF transformation in order for it to provide the appropriate level of national security and become a credible contributor to international peace. It also estimates the current and future military threat to 2025 as low. The major military threats come from non-state and transnational actors in a hybrid and multi-layered form. This kind of environment and roles demand the SAF to act in the entire range of Full Spectrum Operations. The SAF will provide for the national defense at home, contribute to international peace abroad, participate in a system of protection against natural and other disasters, and support other national bodies and organizations in the provision of security.

“Resolution 2025” stresses the need for the advancement in military education, training, science, professional and specialist knowledge, skills, and experience to take place in cooperation with public education and research systems. The transformation process itself will depend on the improvement of organizational culture, strengthening of military values and professional ethics, career development, and implementation of comprehensive care for personnel.

As its personnel are concerned, the target ration of 1:2:5 between officers, NCOs and soldiers is desired. The officers will primarily be recruited through a scholarship policy with only a smaller portion through the promotion from enlisted ranks. Therefore, there is a need for appropriate selection of candidates. The “Resolution 2025” does not address directly those qualifications. In terms of professional education, the “Resolution 2025” does provide some guidance on what kind of knowledge is necessary as it lays down the combat capabilities that will be developed in the SAF. A lot of emphasis is given to the multinational operations, multiagency operations, and civil protection operations. All this provides good guidance on what kind of military professional is to be developed.⁸¹

Based on the documents adopted in 2010, a new Defense Strategy and a new Mid-term Defense Program (SOPR), are being developed but have so far not yet been made officially available. However, I had the privilege to read the document drafts and can confirm that they go in line with the documents adopted in 2010.

The *Military Doctrine* published for the first time in 2006 states that the SAF will always accomplish its mission operating with allied and coalition forces. As the basis for required cooperation development in coalition forces, it sees good relationships between

commanders-in-chief, professionalism, cultural respect, knowledge and an understanding of doctrines and patients in communication. The Doctrine indicates the moral component as one of the three elements of combat power for the SAF. It is the “willingness of SAF service members to face the greatest efforts in combat.” It is to be built through motivation, values, leadership, and management. Motivation is a prerequisite for the service members to identify themselves with the military goals. It is achieved through personal example, conviction in the legitimacy of employing military force, the establishment of cohesion and a system of rewards and punishment. Values are the driving force of the military. They are derived from general civil values, values of the Slovenian society and the nature of military operations. They are implemented through codes of conduct and realized through leadership and training. It is the job of leaders to ensure subordinates respect these values. Patriotism is stated as the basic underlying value of SAF service members. Other values are honor, courage, loyalty, esprit de corps, and selfless service. In the future, more than ever, professionals will have to possess qualities such as personal initiative, resourcefulness, solid judgment, and adaptability.⁸² The leadership in charge of the military is expected to be professionally proficient and responsible, to be able to listen to others and to treat others with respect and dignity, to be trained in basic skills, and to be an example.⁸³

Human resources are the key to SAF success. Organizational culture, values, atmosphere, and leadership are responsible for the SAF achievements. Performance efficiency, professionalization, and leadership are all developed through the care for the welfare of service members.⁸⁴

The SAF professionalization is to be achieved through the process of military education and training of individuals. The doctrine also states that a certain number of officers is to be schooled abroad, especially in fields and skills where having a schoolhouse would be impractical. It is this process that has to generate social and military values in SAF professionals.⁸⁵ Military Doctrine does not address the issue of professionalism in any detail or as a separate subject. Rather it sees it as all-present in all it requires the service members to do.

Since 2009, the *Slovenian Military Ethics* is an official document. The purpose of the document, issued by the government, is to ensure every member of SAF acts honorably in accordance with the ethical guidelines and principles established in the document. The basic ethical guidelines and principles are: patriotism as the basic common value for all the SAF values, upholding of its oath, realization that working in the SAF is not just an occupation, but a way of life, and honoring the Slovenian military tradition. Other ethical principles required in a member of the SAF are: honor, honesty, courage, loyalty, pride, fairness, reliability, responsibility, dedication, sacrifice, expertise, and adjustment of personal interests to those of the unit and the SAF.

The Ethics guidelines also lists things that SAF members are to do in and out of uniform. They have to always show respect and trust, build comradeship, look after the subordinates, uphold the status of equality among all members, respect the dignity of others, respect the basic human rights and liberties, unconditionally execute their tasks, safeguard classified materials, be psychophysically prepared, be experts in using the equipment, and act environmentally friendly. They are not allowed to promote intolerance in any way, show intimate emotions that could affect work or discipline, be

politically active during work or participate in party politics in uniform, or expose their bodies in morally inappropriate ways. When in doubt on how to behave everyone has the right to turn to their superiors who are obligated to give advice.⁸⁶ As can be seen, the Code of Ethics builds on the values and principles as they are stated in other official documents regulating the performance of the SAF.

Formal officer education in SAF is divided into four schools: the Officer School,⁸⁷ the Staff School,⁸⁸ the Higher Staff School,⁸⁹ and the General Staff School.⁹⁰ The Rough equivalents for those schools in the U.S. military would be the Basic Officer Course for the Officer School, the Maneuver Captain Career Course for the Staff School, the Command and General Staff College for Higher Staff School, and War College for the General Staff School.⁹¹ The scope, programs, and learning objectives for each of these schools are prescribed by two documents: the program of the school, and the learning plan of the school.

With these two documents, the syllabuses and the topics are prescribed for each of the four schools. They also prescribe the literature to be used by students and faculty, and learning objectives for the topics. It is however interesting to notice that only the Staff School program includes the qualifications needed by the faculty to be able to teach certain syllabus at the School.⁹²

Surveys On Slovenian Armed Forces

Slovenian Public Opinion surveys are conducted periodically on a number of theme subjects. They have been systematically conducted since 1968, and periodically published. For the purpose of this study, the surveys are taken from the latest book published by Niko Tos and others, *Vrednote v prehodu IV–Slovensko javno mnenje 2004-*

2008. The book is a compilation of research surveys done with the Slovenian population on various subjects. The subjects considered in this study are the Role of Government, National and International Security, Military Occupation, and Values. The surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2007.

The results indicate that the SAFs' roles, in the eyes of the people, in order of preference, are to conduct military training, to conduct military defense in case of aggression, to provide help during natural or other disasters and to fight terrorism. The SAF, however, is not to, under any circumstance, assume the government in the country or be used as a replacement workforce in case of strikes. The public sees a great role for the military in its civil protection mission (natural and other disasters) and considers the military very good at that so far. As for the participation in the international operations, Slovenians support SAF participating in humanitarian missions and peacekeeping missions, but oppose its participation in combat missions. It is also interesting to note that 50 percent of the population thinks that NATO demands the presence of Slovenian soldiers abroad. It also thinks that the SAF should come home from the mission as soon as there would be casualties.

In terms of general values, internet, social equality, gender equality, nation, and small social differences are ranking very high, while religious education in public schools, capitalism and globalization are ranked lowest. Interestingly, the internet is ranked very high while globalization is ranked very low. Slovenians also consider security more important than equality and liberty, and liberty more important than equality.⁹³

As a part of her Ph.D. dissertation in 2008, Manica Jakic conducted a research titled *Socialne Reprezentacije in Organizacijska Kultura v Slovenski Vojski* on social representations and organizational culture in SAF. The research was conducted sampling 730 SAF employees. The number included 133 officers, which represented 10.7 percent of the officer corps in the SAF.

Her research was based on H. E. Scheins' definition of organizational culture and his three distinct levels of culture; artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions. The artifacts are composed of existing technology, language, and patterns of conduct. They are the most easy to observed, but can be misinterpreted. Values are "what should be, compared to what it is." It is important to differentiate among those values that are compatible with underlying assumptions and those that are not. In essence, she speaks of espoused versus expressed values. The underlying assumptions are "the solutions to problems that have been proven effective so often that the members of organization consider them self-evident." Values and underlying assumptions are not necessarily compatible. Values represent the desired solutions, and they are not necessarily compatible with the solutions that work.⁹⁴

The main interest of her research was to determine if the existing culture met the military needs. In addition, it aimed at comparing the desired situation with the actual status of the organizational culture within the system. As the research showed, the desired values, as stated by the military, rank high among the SAOC as well as the perception of the actual status of those values in the SAOC. According to the research, an "individual serving in the SAF should be a professional, to whom this is more than just a job, young, well educated, motivated, with the characteristics of a good leader, loyal to country,

obedient, hardworking, with clear goals, nonaggressive and be able to internalize the values of the SAF.”⁹⁵

Periodically, surveys on the level of trust towards government and non-government institutions in Slovenia are done. The population continuously ranks SAF as an institution it trusts the most. The survey published in the newspaper Dnevnik on 24 June 2011 showed SAF ranked 3.49, on a scale from 1 to 5, followed by medical services 3.19, and police 3.15.⁹⁶ Similarly, the “Center for Public Opinion Research” at the Faculty for Social Sciences in Ljubljana conducts three to four surveys on public opinion yearly. SAF ranks at the top in these surveys. In the latest survey from May 2011, the SAF scored 49 percent of the populations trust, second only to the firefighters with 95 percent.⁹⁷

Conclusion

The theory of military professionalism was developed around the issues relating to civil military relations. The basics of military subordination to the civil authority are agreed upon. However, how that is to be achieved is still debated. That is understandable, since the societies differ among each other and change over time. It seems that a relative strength of the military in the period of Cold War emphasized the problem of civilian control over the military. Therefore, in the works of that period, we can find that defining military professionalism was primarily focused around that relationship. As this relationship, in the post-industrialized nations, has been resolved, other aspects of military professionalism were emphasized. In the post-Cold War period, educating the professional officer, his values and ethics, and the organizational culture of the profession are more emphasized.

Today's discussion of professionalism in the U.S. military is more concerned with the values and ethics of the professional military officer. The discussion in Slovenia, on the other hand, is not so focused on the question of professionalism per se as it is with how to educate the SAF officer, and his legal status in society.

From the written works and documents, be it Slovenian, U.S., or other, a trend is noticed arguing that a new kind of professional officer is required. The base of the argument is in the changing nature of operational environment and dominant threats to post-industrialized society. The research conducted on SAOC and SAF members in general, offers a glimpse into certain aspects of the SAOC professionalism, mainly the organizational culture and social perceptions. It also offers a look into how Slovenian society perceives SAF and its members.

This chapter has established the available literature. The review provides enough material to answer all research questions. The next chapter will discuss the research methodology.

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⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 41, 49, 51.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The primary research question is: What is the state of the SAF Officer Corps professionalism and are changes necessary? The previous chapter established the literature available to research the question. This chapter relates to the research question by laying down the basic methodology used to describe to the reader the approach taken to answer research questions and why certain methods were chosen.

The introduction to the study offers a brief historical perspective on officer corps development in SAF by describing how it was formed and who formed it. This is important as it is the foundation of all the issues affecting SAOC at present.

In the analysis, the study describes the current operational environment and how it is different from what is considered a traditional military operational environment. This is important as it defines the type of officers that are required to lead, manage, and succeed in this kind of environment.

It then discusses the modern profession of arms and a modern professional officer corps. Using the analysis of the research literature, it offers a synthesized definition of the terms “profession of arms” and “professional military officer” in a modern Western post-industrialized society. It also determines what the key attributes of this profession and professional are, how important they are and a narrative description of what exactly they mean. To depict what is necessary to have a modern profession of arms and what is required of the military professional a figure is used. Defining the terms Profession of Arms and Professional Military Officer is important, as there is a need for common understanding of the terms among the allied nations of the Western post-industrialized

nations. At the same time, it gives the further analysis a baseline to focus when examining the SAF Officer Corps in particular.

The next step in the analysis focuses on the SAF Officer Corps. The study analyses the tasks SAOC is expected to perform in the future and the environment it is expected to operate in. They are based on the analysis of the Slovenian national and military strategic documents concerning Slovenian Armed Forces. The analysis of the tasks is important, as they determine what the SAOC is expected to do and be.

The study then analyses the SAOC through the attributes of a modern professional officer corps. It determines the specifics of those attributes as they pertain to the SAOC. The analysis of the articles, research and opinion polls is used to contrast the professed versus expressed characteristic of the professional attributes in SAOC. Tables and diagrams are used to depict certain elements of those attributes. In addition, analysis of the articles published in “Slovenian Armed Forces Bulletin” is used to point out what kind of professional expertise is present in SAF. This part of the analysis is important as it directly addresses the research problem and answers the primary research question.

The conclusion recaptures the answer to the primary and a secondary question established in chapter 4 and identifies gaps in the SAOC professionalism.

Recommendations address the necessary changes in the professional attributes of SAOC. They also offer suggestions on what is to be done for SAOC to become a truly modern professional officer corps.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In the military profession, . . . self-criticism is an essential prerequisite in effecting change . . . self-criticism must have significant intellectual content.

— Moris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political portrait*

Defining Profession of Arms and Professional Officer for 21st Century

The primary research question is “What is the state of SAF Officer Corps professionalism and are changes necessary?” The previous chapter established how the author will approach the research question. This chapter will now discuss the relevant facts and present authors’ point of view as they relate to the primary research question.

To answer the primary research question, one must first look at the environment shaping the answer. Today’s military operational environment has undergone significant changes in the last twenty years, all of which have consequences for the profession of arms and the professional military officer.

A Postmodern Operational Environment

In a traditional sense, the military serves the purpose of fighting a nation’s wars. At the same time, but to a smaller degree, the military was used for other purposes, such as helping in disaster relief efforts at home and abroad, peacekeeping missions, and as one of the tools of diplomacy. However, the last twenty years have brought about a marked increase in the scope and time the military is requested, by the civil society it serves, to perform these other purposes.

As a social scientist, Tomas Durell-Young has suggested, “in a democratic society, violence can only be used in a rational way, for a public purpose, and with the public consent.”¹ This is the basic concept of civil authority over the military. It will remain the chief premises of professionalism in modern post-industrialized western democracies. However, even within this club of nations we find very different emphasis on military roles. In addition, the operational environment since the end of the Cold War has changed considerably. The old bi-polar division of nations is gone, replaced by what can best be described as a state of constant uncertainty.

Globalization has taken full effect. The World Wide Web (WWW) and global media have fundamentally changed the operational environment. Nothing happens in isolation. Better said, if something happens in isolation from the WWW and the global media, it is as if it has not happened. The media in post-industrialized western democracies scrutinize every move their military makes. The impact of “strategic corporal”² is more important than ever in everything the modern military does. However, it seems that the military has a hard time adjusting to that, more so than their criminal-terrorist-insurgent-hybrid opponents do. Part of the reason is the fact that the adversaries in this global conflict do not play by the same rules. While the military serving a democracy is always concerned “with the moral and legal limitations imposed by those they serve, in concert with the constant scrutiny by the global media, its adversaries are usually much less concerned with that”³. This was apparent in the recent U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israeli in Lebanon and Gaza. In a globalized world, it is much more a struggle of ideas than it is of a military force.

Digital technology has considerably increased the military systems capabilities, and its presence on the battlefield cannot be ignored. At the same time, the digital environment has become a battlefield in itself. As the military pursue developing a system of systems to operate in digital environment, they seem to become more and more specialized and complex, while their adversaries have no trouble coming up with simple solutions to combat them. Increasingly complex weapon systems require better-trained individuals. The outsourcing of maintenance to civilian experts is on the rise. While this is not a problem in peace and at home station, it brings new sets of problems when operating in a hostile environment.

The Cold War military was to fight large-scale conventional war between two evenly matched opponents. The point is that, for sixty years, the military had not considered anything other than conventional war as something worth investing time and energy. However, one can argue that the 1991 Gulf War was the last war of that type. The 2003 invasion of Iraq cannot be considered a conventional war between two equal opponents, although it certainly was planned and executed as such.⁴ Therefore, for the last twenty years there has not been a conventional war between equal opponents. Yet combat and deployments put more stress on the military than they ever did during the Cold War period. The counterinsurgency, nation building, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations are the norm of the day. Small wars against diverse enemies present the majority of operational environment for today's post-industrialized western military.

The enemy in these wars can best be described as a combination of dissatisfied and disillusioned locals, complex terrorist networks, and well-trained and equipped

transnational groups constituting a so called “hybrid threat.” Although the military has recognized this new enemy, it warns that focusing merely on this threat will diminish conventional war fighting capabilities, which could in turn jeopardize individual nations’ security. In a world where we have one world power, the United States, and several regional superpowers, this is understandable. Nations are still in competition for resources, which always has a potential for conventional military conflict of some sort.

The period after the Cold War has also witnessed a marked transformation in the legitimacy of military action.⁵ No longer is a nation state a sole provider of legitimacy for military action. Even more importantly, it is not even the most important one. To have legitimacy, a military action needs to have an international approval, either through UN or through some regional politico-security organization such as NATO, African Union, EU or other treaty organization. In a way, it is demanded of the military to serve the “global common life.”⁶ Again, this links back to globalization and the perceptions of population as they are being influenced by the mass media. Even the strongest nations of the world cannot afford a military action without some kind of legitimacy awarded to them by the international community. I believe that to act unilaterally is to be condemned to failure. The inherent right of nations to self-defense is not affected, however, any action outside national territory today requires international legitimacy or at a minimum legitimacy among allies.

The operational environment of today is also the home front and civil-military relations. Civil-military relations in democratic societies are determined by the perception of an external threat by the civil society. Most states today are not threatened with military invasion and the threat of nuclear war is minimal.⁷ Therefore, the population has

a hard time accepting any increase in military spending, and questions the very existence of a state's military apparatus. The change in the relations is evident by the fact that almost all democracies are moving away from a conscript military to an all-volunteer one. Whether that is militarily sound for some of those countries is irrelevant. Since the perception of threat is low, civil society demands a decrease in military spending which will lead to a force reduction. This further complicates military execution of the wide variety of tasks other than war. Since the force size is being reduced, while at the same time new tasks are given to it, it is forced to compromise its capabilities in some areas—such as the capability to conduct major combat operations.

At the same time, political leaders find it impossible to justify sending conscripts on military operations abroad. Even more, as we can see in public opinion polls across Europe, leaders are failing to explain why volunteer military forces are used in faraway places that have little to no impact on the populations' everyday life. Governments do a poor job in explaining why these operations are in the national interest.⁸ Even when the leaders have a clear idea of why they are important, in the interest of the state and society, an individual citizen still finds it hard to understand and to accept them. An all-volunteer military also causes the officer corps to become unrepresentative of the society.⁹

The nature of operations today demands more than just military power. To keep the peace, to rebuild nations, and to relieve humanitarian suffering requires participation of the civil government and non-government organizations in crisis regions.¹⁰ The nature and scope of the job and the expertise required make it impossible for the military to execute it alone. The military needs to provide a physically secure environment in those

crisis regions so other agencies' experts can do their jobs. At the same time, the civilian experts need to improve the quality of life, infrastructure, and essential services in the area of operation to enable the military to keep the environment secured. The interdependence of civil and military elements in crisis regions is, therefore, complete. One cannot operate without the other and vice versa. This gives rise to the importance of having interagency cooperation skills and knowledge at an unprecedented level. It also raises the questions of jurisdiction, who exactly is in charge and of what? The last ten years have brought a considerable improvement in the area of interdependence, but more has to be done.

The military has also seen the rise and use of private security corporations and private contractors. Their presence in the operational environment has brought a completely new set of questions. Outsourcing of sustainment capabilities to contractors makes the military unable to operate without them. In the non-contiguous operational environment, these contractors are very vulnerable and are often deliberately targeted. Private security corporations are competing with the military for highly qualified personnel and are now at the level where they compete with the military for jurisdiction over certain parts of the operational environment. For example, the private firm formerly known as Blackwater is forming a private military (infantry battalion) for the United Arab Emirates.¹¹

The characteristics of modern operational environment are the all present global media, the internet, a complex enemy, an ever present possibility of a conventional war, the changing and stressful civil-military relations at home, reductions in size and funds,

interdependence of military and civil agencies in crisis regions, and the unresolved issues of jurisdiction between military, contractors, and private security corporations.

These changing characteristics in the operational environment require not only a new model of a professional officer, but also redesigning the entire concept of the profession of arms. There is a need for reexamination of the relations between officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and military civilians. In addition and even more importantly, we should place the role of the military in society under scrutiny. However, the scope of this study will only address the profession of arms and the professional officer as is needed to operate successfully in the described operational environment.

Profession of Arms

Based on the research and corresponding to the demands of the current operational environment, I would define the profession of arms as follows:

Profession of arms is a vocation comprised of experts possessing a complex knowledge in managing and employing military forces, certified to use that knowledge under the conditions of responsible obedience to a legitimate government, who are trusted by society, possess a common culture and shared ethics, have a unique self-regulating organization with a recognized professional autonomy.

The above definition is the base for further discussion. Various elements of the definition need to be expanded on, to enhance its understanding. It is as important what the definition encompasses as what it does not. The definition avoids using the word officers, as the profession of arms is not a sole domain of officers. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) too should be included as members of the profession of arms if they are

a part of a military organization that allows them to fulfill all other elements required. Enlisted soldiers lack the leadership, management knowledge, and an inner organization and can therefore, only be considered experts, but not professionals. Society does not award civilians certification and authorization to use military professional knowledge even if they possess one. Therefore, we can consider reservists (officers and NCOs) military professionals as long as they hold their commissions/authorization and adhere to professional standards of conduct. Individuals leaving the profession through resigning, retirement, or discharge for a variety of reasons can no longer be considered members, as they are no longer authorized by the society to practice their profession. They can only consider themselves professionals if called back on duty.

Further, the Huntington's idea of "managing violence" is being replaced by "managing the military force." The reason is in the changing operational environment and related tasks the military will be required to perform. While employment or the threat of violence is still present in all military missions, it is not necessarily the primary focus of today's military operations. Peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and nation building rely on nonviolent military capabilities supported by its capability to use force if necessary. Although the violent aspect is always present, it is no longer the most important.

Professional Military Officers

Following from the proposed definition of the profession of arms and based on the research, I believe modern professional military officers should be defined as follows:

A Professional Military Officer is a member of a profession of arms. He is an expert in employing military force in full spectrum of operations. He is a warrior, scholar and a leader serving his country with selflessness, courage, prudence, caring, and

integrity. He shares a culture of service and sacrifice along with his fellow officers and represents the highest ethical standards of society.

As in the case of the Profession of Arms, individual elements of this definition need to be explained in more detail. A modern military officer is more than an expert in employing weapon systems and units. He is a deep thinker, able to assess consequences of his actions in the full spectrum of life (military, political, cultural, religious, information). He is also expected to perform a wide variety of tasks from administrative to effective problem solving and combat.

It seems almost as if it is impossible to have such an officer today. A lot more is expected than in the past. Nevertheless, it is not impossible. Today, there is more emphasis on an officer's ability to understand the consequences of military action, which go beyond the immediate visible effects of force employment. An officer is not expected to be an expert in political, cultural, religious, information or linguistic matters. He is however, expected to have a good enough understanding of these fields, to gain appropriate situational understanding, and be able to cooperate and assist experts in these fields. As no operation is purely lethal any more, not even major combat operations, he needs the ability to cooperate with other actors in the operational environment. With that, he must always realize what his role is in serving the nation.

Service to the country goes beyond blind obedience to a political will. An officer must possess the courage to oppose that will, based on professional expertise and, if necessary, be selfless enough to refuse what he believes is contrary to his professional expertise. How an officer expresses his opposition is vital. Undermining the authority of civilian leadership is unacceptable. Officers must actively participate in national security

policy development. However, it should not be understood that the obligation to oppose the will of a superior could be extended to junior officers. The principle of subordination and willful execution of lawful order within the military itself cannot be disregarded.

Therefore, specific organizational culture and ethics are at the core of a modern professional officer. In a world where individual rights and freedoms are valued beyond the common good, it is hard to develop an organizational culture of teamwork, sacrifice, and selflessness. Yet that is exactly what is needed. Military leaders must establish a system that will ensure the desired professional officer culture and ethics at all levels.

A professional officer's primary means of motivation is not of a material nature, but that of service. Nevertheless, his service must be compensated, so that he believes his needs are met. Most importantly, he must see that his family's needs are met.

The four pillars the professional officer stands on are professional culture and ethics, extensive education, inner organization providing autonomy, and a relation of trust and service between him and the public. He is as much a warrior as he is a leader and a scholar. To perform all roles, he must be in possession of human development, moral-ethical, military-technical and political-cultural expertise (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Professional officer

Source: Created by author.

What is expected of SAOC

The tasks, capabilities, and the operational environment where SAF is expected to operate define the military-technical, and political-cultural knowledge and expertise its officer corps should possess.

Tasks

The Republic of Slovenia Constitution is very clear and does not see SAF as the primary means of ensuring the Republic's security. Rather it states, "In the provision of security, the state proceeds principally from a policy of peace, and an ethic of peace and non-aggression."¹² Therefore, national defense as a whole, is not primarily entrusted to

SAF. It does however recognize the armed forces as the primary means of executing military defense. The SAF's mission is contained in the Slovenian Defense Act and then reflected in the Military Doctrine. The SAF primary mission is to "in co-operation with the alliance,¹³ deter military aggression against the Republic of Slovenia, contribute to international peace and stability, conduct the military defense, and if necessary reestablish national sovereignty on the entire territory." The tasks following from the mission are to "maintain operational readiness, activate and mobilize forces, deploy forces to the area of operations, conduct defensive operations, conduct offensive operations, and sustain forces." Other important tasks are to "contribute to international peace, security, and stability, and to execute support in ensuring the safety and welfare of citizens."¹⁴

The mission and the tasks cover the whole spectrum of modern military operations. At the same time, national security documents recognize that the SAF will, for the foreseeable future, operate with limited resources. At this time, the SAF is still undergoing a transition in organization and downsizing which, according to plans, by the end of 2011, will bring the size of SAF to ten thousand members, active and reserve. Compared to other countries conducting Full Spectrum Operations, ten thousand troops is a small number. It is hard to imagine for a force this small to be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of operations in all possible operational environments. Despite this, the former Chief of the General Staff, General Janez Slapar has implied that Slovenia does not need an all-volunteer force greater than four thousand.¹⁵ It is unclear what analysis he used to make that recommendation.

National security documents provide SAF with some boundaries as to how to develop and where it can expect to operate until 2025. They assess the military threat to the country as minimal and coming mainly from non-state players such as terrorists, transnational criminals, and a multilayered hybrid threats. However, politicians and the public expect SAF to always be ready to defend the country from outside military threat.

A low military threat to the country does allow SAF to focus part of its forces on other missions, such as fulfilling international obligations, supporting in natural disaster relief at home, and supporting other national agencies. Therefore, the full extents of the missions given to SAF are attainable.

However, due to the limited resources, SAF will give up some of its capabilities, primarily heavy armor units and parts of its air force. The government expects that the capabilities lost will be supplemented by the collective capabilities of the NATO alliance.

Operational Environment

The geographic environment that is of primary interest to national security is the area of South East Europe, North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia. This gives SAF a good focus in developing its strategic capabilities. It also states that SAF will operate in those areas under UN, EU or NATO. The 2010 Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Program of the SAF up to 2025, also clearly states the tactical level of units SAF is to develop for national defense and for operations abroad. Brigade Combat Teams will be a primary tactical unit for the purposes of national defense and Battalion Task Forces for deployment abroad.

Finally, there is a clear requirement in the strategic military documents for a close interaction of the military with the civil society. Most obvious is the requirement for SAF

to provide support to other government agencies in case of natural or man-made disasters in Slovenia. There are also two other requirements. First, that the military develops an educational system in close cooperation with the civil one. Second, that operations abroad will not be solely a task of the military, but will include, and sometimes be led by civilian experts from other government agencies.

The SAF is, therefore, not very different from most modern military in the missions and the operational environment it is expected to perform. The missions are practically the same and encompass the full spectrum of operations. The differences come from the operational environment, which is more limited in scope, and the fact it will give up certain capabilities. These make sense since Slovenia is a small country, its human and financial resources limited, and its strategic interests not as far reaching as for some other bigger NATO members.

Attributes of the Profession and Professional and their expression in SAOC

In Search of Jurisdictional Boundaries

Jurisdictional boundaries have always been an issue for every profession including the military. For example, there has always been a competition for the jurisdiction over the patients' health between the medical doctor and clergy. The same holds true for the relation between clergy and civil lawyers in the area of legal issues.

The issue of jurisdictional boundaries for the military today consists of several elements. First, with the rise of an all-volunteer military, contractors work on jobs within the military. These jobs are essential for the functioning of an armed force, but do not require military skills. They do not pose a serious challenge, as they do not interfere with

security matters traditionally reserved for the military. They do, however, bring up issues of contractor security on deployments, and managing their services when the military deploys.

Second is the rise of private security services and contractors. They pose a serious issue as they perform the same task as parts of the military, but are not bound by the ties of service to any nation or society. In crisis regions, they often work side by side with the military and their actions often reflect on the military they work around and the country they come from.

Third is a problem with the military operating in areas and matters that are domain of other vocations and professions. This is most evident in stability and support operations where the military is often required to perform a task that is otherwise the domain of non-government organizations (NGOs) and other government agencies. This is often, but not exclusively done in areas where the security situation does not allow unarmed organizations to operate. Although in recent years, one can see a marked improvement in outlining jurisdictions between military, other government, and NGOs.

Fourth is the role the military plays in homeland security. Often the scope of disasters overwhelms the country's civil protection capabilities, and the military is directed to intervene. Jurisdictional boundaries in these cases are very sensitive. However, it seems most countries have developed legislation clearly outlining the responsibilities.

It is not up to the military professional officers to decide where their jurisdiction lies. The most officers can do is to provide advice to their civilian leaders as to what the military can be expected to do effectively within the confines of laws and constitution, or

a countries equivalent. The fact remains that if the society decides it no longer requires a military, and that it can provide for its security in another way, a true professional will have to accept the decision. However, this is not likely to happen. The military will become smaller and the societies will impose more and more restrictions on it. The paradox is that the very security that the military provides to society is its existential enemy. A secure society believes there is no need for an armed force providing security and has very little interest financing it.

As the operational environment changes, the military must adapt to new circumstances. If it is not to be considered obsolete, it must reprioritize its roles in a changed operational environment. Its focus must shift, and with it training and missions. Today we find the military operating alongside NGOs and the interagency at home and abroad. At the same time, the private sector has moved to fill the void created by the new nature of an all-volunteer military and thus changed the operational environment.

Jurisdictional Boundaries and SAOC

The Slovenian Armed Forces do not conduct contracting support to the same extent as the U.S. or other major European military. Major weapon systems maintenance contracting, for end items such as wheeled armor personal carriers, information technology and hi-tech equipment are awarded to civilian companies or equipment manufacturers in Slovenia. Services such as barracks maintenance and security remain the domain of the military. Providing the guards for the barracks and depots is still in the task of combat units, and presents a major strain on manpower and training efficiency.

Joining NATO can be seen as a form of contracting some of the capabilities previously held at national level. The politicians have often used an argument of

enhancing security through relaying on NATO capabilities. In fact, Slovenia has contracted the defense of its airspace to NATO.

The SAF is not yet directly faced with the private sector competition for security missions it performs, nor does it have to coordinate its missions with them. That is not to say that it will not have to do this in the future. As private security firms expand their operations, the SAF will eventually have to operate with or alongside them. Having an understanding and knowledge as to how they operate and under what jurisdiction, will be required.

The SAF has limited experiences in coordinating its efforts with NGOs. It is, however, familiar with civil-military (CIMIC) operations and has had the opportunity to integrate other government agency representatives into its task forces. Experiences with the latter so far are positive.

The SAF experiences in civil protection missions at home are extensive, and mainly positive. The 2010 floods have pointed to some legislation deficiencies in ensuring timely responsiveness. However, legislation does provide for clear jurisdictional boundaries, and command and control system between the military and civil protection corps.

Extensive Education Giving Expert Knowledge

An education system plays a crucial role in developing a professional officer corps. It not only provides the expert knowledge and an environment where military science can flourish, but it also reinforces all other aspects of professionalism: ethics, values, value of trust and service, leadership and others. As Martin L. Cook has suggested, an “army must create intellectual capability to get ahead of environmental

changes, to embrace them, and to demonstrate intellectual capability.”¹⁶ The complex operational environment demands a professional officer.

Educating officers constitutes a significant investment for any country. With the changing environment and expanding tasks for the military, officers need to have more and more precise knowledge. Since the education is now a considerable investment, officer selection is very important. Martin Van Creveld suggests a different approach to officer selection, one that is not preconditioned by civil education and is utilized in Israel, Vietnam, and Germany.¹⁷ The point being that education, while important, is no guarantee for creating a warrior and a leader. The latter two traits are still a very important part of a modern officer. In modern noncontiguous operational environments, junior officers are put in positions of enormous responsibilities. Officer selection process must, therefore, ensure that candidates have the right leadership and warrior potential. That potential is not always linked to a civilian degree.

According to a U.S. military, December 2010, White Paper, there are “four categories of expertise a modern officer must possess: military technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural.”¹⁸ These four categories encompass key competences of a military officer, as defined by Thomas Durell Young; managing organizations, planning, technology, training, and leadership and command¹⁹.

The first step in an officer’s educational process is selection. Once selected, his career-long process of professional development begins. The knowledge he will attain through formal military education will form the basis of his expertise. None of the aforementioned categories of expertise is more important than the other. Military technical knowledge is very important at junior levels for platoon and company grade officers,

while the political-cultural awareness becomes more important with field grade and general officers. The human development and especially moral-ethical knowledge and expertise are also important throughout one's career. That is not to say that junior officers do not need political-cultural knowledge or field grade officers can do without military-technical awareness. Rather it is a matter of focus. Junior officers must possess an understanding of the political-cultural implications of applying their military-technical expertise and field grade officers must maintain their technical proficiency.

A modern officer's professional education is a career-long process due to the extent of the knowledge and expertise expected. Officers must be encouraged to pursue knowledge beyond their formal civilian education. Cooperation with civilian institutions should and must be encouraged. However, as Navy Captain Ljubo Poles has suggested, expanding civil education at the expense of the military expertise should not occur.²⁰ If the civilian education enhances military expertise, its integration should be encouraged. Civil-military education systems integration with the sole purpose of officers being competitive in a civil work-force market should not be encouraged.

An even more important issue is who educates the officer corps? Having qualified teaching faculty is paramount. Qualifications do not require only knowledge but also appropriate experience, motivation, and most importantly teaching ability. Only the nation's civilian and military's best should be chosen to educate officers at all levels if one is to develop a truly professional officer corps.

For most qualified officers having a good teaching record at all levels of military education should be a requirement for future command assignments. This would have several benefits. First, it would ensure future leaders at all levels are receiving the best

education a military can provide. Second, it would give the future commanders the ability to influence more than just their immediate subordinates. Third, it would give them time to focus more on their own personal development away from the troops. Fourth, it would provide future commanders with invaluable experience on how to mentor their subordinates.

Making a teaching position a requirement for future command above platoon level would also positively influence the desire of ambitious and capable officers to compete for the job. At the same time it prevents commanders from keeping the best of their officers in units and away from sharing their experiences with a wider body of the officer corps.

As for the civilian teaching faculty, it should only be used for topics where military expertise does not exist in sufficient numbers, such as military history, strategic-national policy decision making, civil protection, non-government and interagency cooperation, international and domestic law and others. It too must be carefully selected. When linking military and civilian education institutions and developing officer educational programs, one must develop a capable officer corps able to lead the military, as opposed to developing one that can compete on the civilian job market.

Education and Expert Knowledge in SAOC

One of the conclusions in the 2009 Internal Defense Review was that there is a problem with training faculty in the SAF educational system.²¹ In addition, research conducted by Liliana Brozic on the candidates at various levels of SAF educational system has shown there is a considerable gap in the quality of the teaching faculty and

literature when compared with the ones at corresponding civilian institutions (see figures 2 to 4).²²




Figure 2. The teaching material based on the latest developments
Source: Liljana Brozic and Dusan Susnik, “Education Process Evaluation with Emphasis on Military Contents” (Information Society 16 October 2009), 24.




Figure 3. Activity of the teaching faculty in their field of expertise
Source: Liljana Brozic and Dusan Susnik, “Education Process Evaluation with Emphasis on Military Contents” (Information Society 16 October 2009), 24.




Figure 4. Command and Staff School organization

Source: Liljana Brozic and Dusan Susnik, "Education Process Evaluation with Emphasis on Military Contents" (Information Society 16 October 2009), 25.

As demonstrated in the literature presented for this study, there is a lot of activity in the SAOC educational system development. The current system is highly criticized by defense experts outside the system and at the same time vigorously defended, as appropriate, from within. As Colonel Tos Dusan, SAF Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has stated "we have exactly the kind of schools we are capable of having. For the period we were operating in, the system was satisfactory."²³ However, one cannot miss the facts stated in the article by Zabkar Anton and Svete Uros, where they clearly identify the crucial deficiencies in the officer educational system as compared to other modern military. The lack of qualified teaching faculty, the absence of entrance criteria for the teaching faculty, the lack of technical subjects, and the disproportion between training and education are all serious deficiencies immensely affecting the level of professionalism of the SAOC.²⁴

The most obvious deficiency is the lack of suitable assignment criteria for the teaching faculty. As the literature review has shown, only the Staff Officer Course has prescribed criteria for those who can teach. However, the criteria is very broad and does not include any requirements as to the key assignments an officer should have prior to teaching, or an officer's evaluation reports ensuring that the officer performed satisfactory prior to teaching.²⁵ A good example of how this criterion should be defined is the U.S. Military Command and General Staff College, where the criterion for the teaching faculty is well defined.

As both Professor Anton Zabkar and the current defense minister, Professor Ljubica Jelusic have stated: "the independent resources in foreign military publications have assessed that 70 percent of the SAOC is under qualified."²⁶ This, of course, puts Colonel Tos' statement into perspective. The military educational system may have been the best SAF was capable of having, but one must wonder if it was ever satisfactory. The massive under qualification did not happen overnight, nor will the SAF be able to improve it quickly. The issue is not the title and the format of the education, it is the content and how it is delivered. Improving on that requires deliberate planning, patience and time, and strikes directly at any assessment of the SAOC professionalism.

One of the practices in the SAF Officer School is that the best officer candidates in a class stay at the School to train and educate future generations. That may not be the best possible solution for two reasons. First, it keeps the best officer graduates away from units, where they are most needed, and where they could get much needed experience. Second, it does not allow the incoming generation of officer candidates to be trained and educated by experienced cadre from operational units. As good as the school is, it does

not present the latest operational experiences from units. As the current defense minister, Ljubica Jelusic has established,

The answers as to what knowledge and skill is needed in the officer are hidden in operational units and among those officers serving on international operations and duties. Officers, with no personal experiences of leading units on operations abroad and in maneuver forces . . . will not find the correct answers, to what kind of knowledge is necessary for new officers.²⁷

The senior officers from the SAF Training and Doctrine Command maintain that although there is room for improvement in the SAOC educational system, it is essentially comparable with other western military and thus satisfactory.²⁸ Even when there is recognition for the need for change, it is linked to the format of education and not its products. On the other hand, the civilian defense experts continually stress that there are deeper problems that make the product - an officer not comparable to those of the western military. They have solid metric data to prove their point.

SAF joined NATO with an officer corps that was unprofessional by the latter's standards. The 2003 decision to move to an all-volunteer force has additionally complicated the problem by considerably downsizing the force. The lack of operational experience and lack of political will to professionalize the officer corps has resulted in an educational system that is in form similar to the ones in NATO. However, it is essentially focused on "individual promotion requirements,"²⁹ skills over education, and is a victim of "personal and partial interests over national."³⁰ As such, it is not providing SAF with the officer corps capable of dealing with twenty-first century challenges.

The strategic national security documents of 2009 and 2010 give the SAF enough guidance to focus knowledge and expertise of its officer corps in military-technological

and cultural-political areas. They also provide guidance as to what level of tactical knowledge and expertise are most important for SAOC (brigade and battalion).

The SAF has undergone serious transformation and received a lot of new equipment in the last ten years in accordance with the strategic guidance on development. However, the analysis of “Contemporary Military Challenges” magazine, previously “Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces,” gives some surprising results. The purpose of the magazine is “To support the development of Slovenian military intelligentsia and allow critical discussion on contemporary military developments, defense and security systems, and warfare.”³¹ Analysis of the articles published since May 2002 shows twenty-nine numbers, containing 294 articles. Of those articles there is not one written on the subjects of armor, air force, or navy. Since the national strategic documents envision a considerable reduction in armor and air force capabilities, in fact, retirement of the entire tank and airplane fleets into a strategic reserve, one would expect some reaction from military professionals. There was not a single article published by an armor officer or fixed wing pilot arguing for or against such plans. There is also no professional articles published on transport aircraft and navy ship requirements, although these are arguably one of the major purchases the SAF made in recent years or will occur in the coming years.

In a period when SAF was undergoing the largest transformation in its history, from conscription to all-volunteer force, there were exactly two articles written that could be related to the subject. In all, there were so far eight articles written that could be related to the development of SAF as a whole.

Since SAF has been continuously involved in international operations since 1997, one would expect numerous articles written on the experiences of those operations. In fact, there are all-together only six articles written on the subject. Of those, four are general topics on different aspects of SAF participation in operations abroad, and two are written on direct experiences of operations (CIMIC and military intelligence in Kosovo).

On military-technical subjects, there are two articles written on field artillery and two on military communications systems. There is one written on infantry weapons testing. On military-tactical related subjects, there are six articles. Military history accounts for three articles.

In all two hundred and ninety four articles, there was not a single article written on the war in Iraq or Afghanistan. There are articles written and one issue dedicated to the subject of combating terrorism. The articles are mainly concerned with terrorism related security issues in South East Europe, and have no direct link to SAF participation in counterterrorism.

The majority of the articles written in “Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces” are on broader security and defense issues one expects from senior military leadership and civil defense experts. They have some relevance in political-cultural, human development and moral-ethical fields of professional officer expertise. However, they have no relevance in military-technical field of expertise.

The above analysis of the articles shows lack of professional knowledge and/or interest in SAOC. Either way, it sends a strong signal as to the state of SAOC professionalism.

Relation of Trust and Service between the Officer Corps and Civil Society

The military today is required to perform a whole spectrum of operation ranging from full-scale conventional war to civil support and nation building. The military in democratic societies has accepted the tasking and is trying to execute them to the best of its abilities. The simple fact is that it is being asked to do too much. An old military maxim says, “To defend everything is to defend nothing.” It is only the world’s strongest military, the U.S. military, that can conceivably be able to perform a full spectrum of operations. However, even it does that by accepting risks in some areas, as units cannot be truly proficient at more than one task at any given time. Everything else is compromised to a varying degree. Societies must provide clear guidance on what is the most important task in the full spectrum of operations. When they are unable to do so, military professionals must clearly state what they are able to do within their expert knowledge and where the society must accept risk. By doing that, the professional officer executes one of the basic obligations of service to the society.

Due to the changed operational environment and requirement for full spectrum operations, the professional military officer must move from the traditional concept of “blind obedience”³² to what James Burk has called “responsible obedience.”³³

Meanwhile, an even bloodier battle was going on with Sunni insurgents in Fallujah, where the Bush administration had ordered the Marines to storm the city . . . Abizaid had argued for postponing the moves against Sadr until after Fallujah attack. . . . Only days after the Fallujah assault President Bush suspended it. . . . Once the civilians had made their decision, Abizaid believed it was his job to execute it as if it were his own.³⁴

The above quotation is from David Cloud’s and Greg Jaffe’s book *The Fourth Star*. It goes to show how U.S. generals, during the last Iraq war, were not applying the “responsible obedience” concept with often-disastrous consequences. They did argue

against the decisions made by politicians in Washington D.C., from the Congress to the President, but once the decisions were made, they often supported them without question. Whether this was due to personal ambition or a sense of professionalism is irrelevant. The complexities of the operational environment and professional expertise today demand a different professional approach. As doctors and lawyers, two occupations considered professions, a professional officer will have to be able to say no to his client, the state. A doctor will never prescribe treatment he considers unprofessional, and a lawyer will never breach a client-lawyer privilege if they are to remain professionals. So why should an officer do something his professional expertise tells him he must not do, to succeed in the task he is given?

The issue is that the military officer is subordinate to civil authority, while that same relationship, in the case of a civilian and a doctor or a lawyer, is one where the civilian is subordinate to the professionals' expertise. In addition, the state cannot have officers saying no to the given tasks just because they believe they can. That would make the military useless. What is needed is a relationship of equals between military and political leaders, based on professional expertise of each. On the military side, that expertise is linked to the knowledge and understanding of the operational environment and capabilities. When a military leader is asked to do something that contradicts his professional expertise, he must inform his political boss that he cannot execute what is asked of him and if possible explain why. If the political leaders insist on the execution as directed, the officer must remove himself from that position. After all, can he truly execute something he believes is essentially beyond his expertise, wrong, or unethical?

That would be like a pediatrician conducting a surgery. He is a doctor but does he have the expertise to conduct a surgery?

Going back to the example from *The Fourth Star*, one cannot but have a notion that politicians are to be blamed for the fiasco caused by the Iraqi insurgency. The responsibility is as much theirs as it is the military, since its leaders did not refuse to implement political directives they knew, based on their professional expertise, would have dire consequences, i.e. disbanding the Iraqi Army and de-Ba'athification.

In order for the society to trust the military, it must have confidence in their professionalism. It must trust their military-technical expertise, as well as their moral-ethical stance that prohibits them from abusing the power to act against a civil population. On the other hand, the military must have trust in the civil society. Trust that their service will be rewarded and their sacrifice respected. Trust, therefore, goes both ways. If any of the sides loses the others trust, it is very hard to get it back.

One can always argue that Bengt Abrahamsson and Sam C. Sarkesian were correct in claiming that military and politics are impossible to separate, but that does not mean that the pursuit of Huntington's objective control should be discarded. Although the ideal objective control is probably out of reach, in its less than ideal form, it is still better for a society than the subjective control, where the civilian control is absolute and the professional officer corps nonexistent. Through the maximization of the professionalization of the officer corps (as far as possible), and the institutions of civilian control such as parliamentary commissions, civilian supreme commander, civilian administrative control of the military and others, one could established a balanced

relationship between the military and civil society that would benefit the society as a whole.

Trust and Service in SAOC

Public opinion polls show that SAF is among the most trusted government institution in Slovenia.³⁵ It is second only to the Fire Department. Firefighting is a local folklore in Slovenia, therefore, the enormous trust people have in it is not surprising. SAF leadership is quick to point out its high ranking among government institutions. However, just what exactly do those numbers tell us? If compared over time for the last ten years, it can be established that the level of trust into SAF has never gone over 50 percent or below 40 percent. It is only in recent years, with the economic and social crisis, that SAF has moved into the front, but not by increasing the level of trust among the civil population, but by the fact that all other institutions have lost a lot of the trust.

In addition, if comparing these numbers with the level of trust the U.S. public expresses towards its armed forces, one can see that the numbers are much higher in the U.S., closer to 80 percent.³⁶ A public support for the SAF of 49 percent means that less than half of the population trusts the SAF. Further, 12 percent of the population have very little or no confidence in the SAF, which leaves 39 percent that cannot decide whether they do or do not have confidence in the SAF, or they just do not care. In either case, for an all-volunteer military that relies on public self-image for recruiting, these are actually not optimistic numbers.

In addition, a considerable part of the Slovenian intellectual elite actively opposes the idea of the SAF. They have been promoting their idea since before independence. In 2010 roughly, nine thousand people signed the latest initiative, one initiated by the

magazine “Mladina,” to disband the SAF.³⁷ The initiative’s main point was that the SAF is too small and incapable of homeland defense, and represents nothing but a burden to the budget. The resources should, instead, be used on social projects and personnel retrained for socially beneficial roles, maintaining only a token force of 500 soldiers to perform protocol duties and minor international obligations. One can argue the sensibility of such initiative. However, at least part of the population obviously does not consider any outside threat to their security, which speaks highly to its belief in the level of security now provided.

It was expected that an open public debate would be produced because of the initiative. However, no such thing occurred. The Ministry of Defense has officially condemned any such initiative as unconstitutional, and there was no open public debate as for the purpose and the future of the SAF, although a debate was conducted in the Parliament. However, its results were not published, and no information campaign informing the public of the SAF roles and responsibilities was launched as a result of it. Therefore, the SAF has missed an opportunity to present the expertise and knowledge of its military professionals, and increase the public’s confidence in it.

There is also a matter of uneasy relationship between the SAF and members of parliament, especially its Defense Committee. The SAF is currently involved in NATO led operations in Afghanistan with no caveats and without parliament’s approval. The decision to go to Afghanistan was made at the executive and not the legislative level.

However, as public opinion polls have also shown, Slovenian public does support SAF’s involvement in disaster relief operations at home as well as involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It is, however, against its involvement in

NATO's combat operations.³⁸ This data supports the idea that the SAF is still considered more of a "peoples' military," whose primary role is to conduct homeland defense and provide support to the population in crisis times and not a professional all-volunteer force trained, equipped, and ready to be used wherever national interests would dictate. The quick 2003 shift from a conscript to an all-volunteer force was not followed by a shift in the peoples' minds as to the expanded purposes of an all-volunteer force.

It is also interesting to note that 50 percent of the population, according to the poll, considers the SAF's involvement in operations abroad as a requirement imposed by NATO.³⁹ Either this is a failure of politicians, who do not care what people think or they are actively using this position to justify the unpopular decisions to send the SAF to these operations, therefore misleading the population. In a sovereign country, no decision to send troops abroad is made without the express consent and approval of the country's political leadership.

There is a clearly expressed desire and expectation on the part of SAF leadership to receive guidance from the political leadership as to what is expected from the SAF and what will be provided to fulfill those expectations.⁴⁰ The level of trust between public, politics, and the SAF in Slovenia is moderate. There is a lack of understanding among these subjects, and a lack of open public debate that would help improve the confidence between these elements. The general public has certain expectations of the SAF that are clearly expressed through public opinion polls. However, the politicians and SAF leadership seem to have failed to communicate its new purposes, tasks, and capabilities. As long as the general situation in Slovenia and the region remains peaceful, this is not

going to be a major problem. With the appearance of a crisis, the shock may be considerable.

Inner Organization Providing Autonomy

Most theorists argue that a professional officer corps has a need for self-regulation or self-policing. It should be in the form similar to the other professions with their own professional associations (i.e. Medical or Bar associations). Due to the nature of relations between the officer corps and the society, where the officer corps is subordinate to the civil authority and cannot operate outside it, the level of autonomy known to doctors and lawyers is not possible. Since doctors and lawyers do not only operate within the state system, but also independently of it and sometimes even against it, they have more autonomy to set their own standards. As the officer corps manages the most violent capabilities of society, it will never be allowed complete autonomy.

However, the officers must be allowed to have some control over their own ranks independent of society. There are several ways to do that. Once the civil leadership has established basic guidelines, requirements and expectations for the military, the officer corps must control the requirements for entry into the officer corps, promotion boards, educational system, and framing promotion standards. This is only possible if they display professionalism that constantly values and builds the trust between themselves and the society. If the officer corps loses this trust, the society will intervene into those areas and shape them as it sees fit. This is not always best, as the society lacks the knowledge and expertise to understand the complexities of the officer profession. The autonomy given to the profession of arms must also allow the officers to disagree with their civilian leadership, as long as the disagreement is on the level of professional

knowledge. They must be allowed to disagree without consequences to the military organization and the autonomy of the profession.

SAOC Inner Organization

SAOC does not possess a formal inner organization, which would give it a level of autonomy in deciding on professional matters concerning its members. The “Slovenian Officer Association”⁴¹ is a volunteer organization and is more of a social club than a professional organization with any authority over its members. Although it claims to be a forum for professional debate and to have the ambition of participating in professional matters of national security, its role in these matters is negligible.

SAOC has no formal leverage over its membership independent of civil institutions in Slovenia. The SAF does not have an independent system of military justice such as a Uniformed Code of Military Justice in the U.S. or British Armed Forces Act 2006. At the most, commanders can initiate a disciplinary procedure against any member of the armed forces, which in fact can be conducted outside the Slovenian court system. However, the procedure is highly cumbersome and bureaucratic and commanders are not sufficiently trained in it. Therefore, the results are often disappointing.

There is also no regimental system or officer messes in the SAF, similar to the U.S. and especially British Armed Forces. The officers, therefore, rarely spend time together outside their working environment.

Requirements for entry into the officer corps in the SAF are not controlled by the officer corps, but are prescribed by law. In fact, the officer corps does control the promotion boards. However, the promotion criteria is based on civilian law for public employees and is not sufficiently further developed in terms of professional performance,

which leaves room for promotions based on personal relationships rather than expertise and experience.

Culture and Ethics: Linking Artifacts, Values and Underlying Assumptions

Organizational culture also shapes professional behavior. It is the basis for military professionalism.⁴² Military “culture is a system of shared meaning held by its Soldiers, the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution over time.” It is “how we do things around here.”⁴³ It manifests on three distinct levels. First are the artifacts that lie at the surface and are the culture’s visible signs. Second, there are the values and beliefs that define what is important within the military. Here one has to be careful, because there might be a difference between the values officially endorsed and those that are actually in use. Last, we have the underlying assumptions. These solutions have repeatedly proven themselves to be taken for granted and no longer challenged.⁴⁴

Professional culture must reflect professional values and individual officer values must be compatible with military values if one is to have a professional officer corps.⁴⁵ In a contemporary environment, this is difficult. Traditionally military values come in the form of honor, pride, patriotism, nationalism, duty, discipline, institutional trust, dedication, and others. However, in a modern society, nationalism and patriotism are not as highly ranked and the social relationships are loosened. Individuals are more self-sufficient, avoid long-term commitments, and are motivated by both material benefits and self-serving interests.⁴⁶ With the changing environment the military has to recognize the need to reformulate values, or risk alienating itself from society. Today’s military has to

reflect values as impartiality, tolerance, contribution to peace support operations, and support to global institutions such as the UN.⁴⁷

Aligning these values is the job of the senior military leaders. First, they must live values and beliefs they want to promote, so that junior officers have clear models to imitate. Second, promotion and reward systems must recognize behavior in line with military values and, even more importantly, punish behavior not in line with them. Third, doctrine, regulations and other policy statements must be coordinated and values expressed in them must be aligned so there is no doubt as to what is expected. Fourth, the values and beliefs expected of the military personnel and officers in particular, must be achievable and aligned with the ones in the general society.

If the society, in general, values individual success and occupational incentives, the military cannot completely override these with the value of selfless service. There are two interconnected reasons for that. First, it will find it extremely difficult to recruit the officers from a general population since there will be a conflict of values. That might be one of the reasons the professional military self-recruits more and more of its officer corps. Second, one does not want its officer corps to have a completely different value system than the one of the society if it is to expect a relationship of trust and service to develop between the two. The value system of the general society must support and complement the military one. As Charles Moskos has insisted, the traditional military values in the West are still valid, but they are “in a strong competition with the occupational incentives of the marketplace.”⁴⁸

In a contemporary environment, officers seek moral justification for what they do. At the same time, society seeks a moral justification for the use of the military. A modern

military organization has to provide that moral justification for its actions if it is to ensure the support of the society and its officers. Therefore, at the heart of the military culture is ethics. “Increased lethality on the battlefield and increased complexities of the operational environment demand a strong institutional ethics and well-developed character and ethos at the soldier level.”⁴⁹ How hard this is has been repeatedly demonstrated by the well-publicized incidents in Western media. Whether it is the U.S. abusing prisoners in Abu Graib, Belgians and Italians torturing civilians in Somalia, German racists outbursts during conscript training, or the French civilian abuses in the Ivory Coast, all military establishments are faced with the same issues of unethical behavior of their troops.

The evolving threat in the contemporary operational environment has made it difficult to abide by the moral values the military is supposed to protect. Therefore, the ethics must be used for three purposes. First, “it must establish core principles as guidelines for moral judgment” in different operational situations. Second, “it must help commanders adapt to the operational context, through applying its principles.” Third, “it must provide the standards and framework for the development of individual soldier’s character by instilling the profession’s values and virtues.”⁵⁰

It is up to the officers as leaders to ensure this. “Values and ethics that are not expressed in action are meaningless.”⁵¹ Officers serve as role models for the rest of the military organization. Both the individual soldiers and the general public constantly scrutinize their actions. At the same time, they are only human. One cannot expect them to be flawless. They will make mistakes, but organizational culture, climate, and ethics

should allow them to do the right thing when those mistakes happen and to learn from those mistakes, if possible, without having a devastating impact on their career.

Artifacts in SAF

The military uniform appearance in SAF is too loosely regulated. The combat uniform dress rules have not yet been updated from the previous type. The result is a lack of uniformity among individuals and units, although the “Service Regulations” demand it. With no clear rules on how to wear uniforms, it is impossible to impose clear standards thorough the SAF. Although it is generally accepted that the enforcement of dress rules and discipline is up to Non-Commissioned Officers, it is the Commissioned Officers who are responsible for establishing the rules and making sure they are followed.

General practice among higher headquarters at Battalion Headquarters and above is not to use ranks when addressing someone but only his or her first name. The practice is widespread through the military especially when addressing women. Although generally considered a sign of good relationships, it completely negates the hierarchical military structure, is in violation of “Service Regulations,” and due to the particularities of Slovenian language,⁵² often leads to unnecessary conflicts in stressful situations.

Saluting is not enforced in SAF. The Rules of Service are clear on when and who is to be saluted, however, the enforcement of the rules varies. Combat units have stricter practices regarding saluting while combat support, combat service support and higher headquarters have progressively more relaxed practices. This often results in conflict situations as personnel moves through installations and units.

Rituals such as morning flag ceremonies vary from installation to installation. Some installations conduct it daily, others weekly. Some do not conduct it if it is raining or snowing. The presence requirements also vary greatly.

The use of expert language is one of the major issues in SAF. Despite the existence of a Slovenian military dictionary and an approved dictionary of translated military terms from English into Slovenian, the written and spoken professional language in the SAF is not uniform throughout the force. This is a major failure of the military educational system.

The fixed working time and by hour payment method of a public employee, has resulted in a sort of ritual in the morning at 0730 and in the afternoon at 1530 during which people cue in front of the time check machine to come to work or go home respectively as in a plant. This greatly reinforces the feeling of a bureaucratic organization. In addition, the rules of public employees that apply to members of SAF, are in direct conflict with the professional demands of service, as established by Major Alenka Petek, in her 2011 article.⁵³

It would seem the SAF has no rituals honoring its heroes. You cannot find their stories published on military installations, neither are their actions in any detail discussed in the military educational system. The only exception being General Rudolf Maister,⁵⁴ the organizer of the first Slovenian Army in 1918 and the defender of the northern national border.

SAOC and SAF Values

The 2006 SAF military doctrine has consolidated SAF values as patriotism, honor, loyalty, esprit de corps, courage, and selfless service.⁵⁵ The research conducted by

Dr. Manica Jakic can be used to deduct how these values are realized among SAOC. The results in her Ph.D. dissertation offer the following conclusions. Two of the highest ranked values among SAOC, integrity and respect, are not found in official SAF doctrine. Patriotism, which is, according to doctrine, the common fundamental SAF value, is not even among the six highest-ranking ones. It is ranked tenth. However, when looking at the perceptions of the realization of military values among SAOC, patriotism is ranked first, followed by perseverance, esprit de corps, integrity, courage, selfless service, loyalty, and respect. Honor, as one of the official values, is ranked thirteen in the realization ranking (see table 1).⁵⁶

Table 1. SAOC values			
SAOC values rankings		SAOC values realization	
integrity	1	patriotism	1
respect	2	perseverance	2
esprit de corps	3	esprit de corps	3
honor	4	integrity	4
loyalty	5	courage	5
selfless service	6	selfless service	6
courage	7	loyalty	7
perseverance	8	respect	8
care	9	care	9
patriotism	10	order	10
success	11	success	11
order	12	ambition	12
innovation	13	honor	13
power	14	altruism	14
compassion	15	innovation	15
ambition	16	power	16
altruism	17	compassion	17
humility	18	humility	18

Source: Created by author using data from Manica Jakic, *Values and Perceptions Regarding the Realization of Military Values of Slovenian Armed Forces Members* (Bulletin of Slovenian Armed Forces: Ministry of Defense, November 2010), 90, 91.

Based on the following analysis, SAF values do not entirely reflect the values of the SAOC. Patriotism is not viewed as important for individual SAF officers but, at the same time, SAOC members obviously think that patriotism is realized in SAF. This means that it is low on a personal list of values, but high on the SAF list. SAF has therefore failed to align its fundamental values with those of individual SAOC members. It has also failed to communicate the importance of some of the other values to its officer corps.

There are several issues here. First, most of the SAOC membership and especially junior officers do not have the opportunity to observe senior leadership living SAF values, other than on deployments. This goes back to the nature of a public employee working schedule, absence of formal and informal inner organization, and a cultural perception of separating private and business life. In addition, the media appearances by senior SAF leadership are mainly limited to reports of involvement in corruption scandals and alleged violations of soldiers' rights. Therefore, the image junior officers and organizational level officers are getting of its senior leadership is not supporting the lead by example principle in relation to SAF values.

The SAF promotion and reward systems do not formally evaluate an individual's adherence to SAF values. The yearly officer evaluation report does not have a section where adherence to SAF values could be assessed. It does, however, have "ethicality" as one of the evaluation criteria, and does assess an individual's leadership qualities.⁵⁷

The SAF values are not enforced upon its members. Other than the 2006 Military Doctrine, no other document clearly spells them out, nor are they being reinforced

through other SAF professional publications, officer education, and unit mentorship programs.

SAOC and SAF underlying Assumptions

To appropriately address the underlying assumptions in SAF, more extensive research would be required. That however is beyond the scope of this study. However, as Manica Jakic has suggested in her work “all underlying assumptions are first hypotheses, an intuition that something is an underlying assumption.”⁵⁸

The following are some underlying assumptions based on the research so far. First is that SAF officers are not professionals but mere public employees-bureaucrats. This is reinforced through current legislation and pay systems.⁵⁹ Second, that the SAF officer development courses and schools do not produce professionals due to the lack of qualified teaching faculty. Third, that civilian leadership is not interested in matters of national security beyond their partial party interests. Fourth, nothing can be changed because there is no desire to change. The above-suggested underlying assumptions make it clear SAF is struggling with its professional identity.

SAF Ethics

SAF has had an official ethics document since July 2009. The purpose of the “SAF Ethical Code” as it is entitled is “for every member of SAF to act honorably in execution of his duties in accordance with ethical guidelines and principles.”⁶⁰ Every member of SAF has to sign a statement accepting the guidelines and principles of the Ethical Code. The Ethical Code itself includes all the SAF values, in addition to several others the SAF members are required to possess.

The document in itself is a good document providing moral guidelines for action of the SAOC in different operational environments, at home and abroad. It clearly defines what desirable action is and what it is not. The problem of course is that it is just words on a paper. As it was said previously, “Values and ethics that are not expressed in action are meaningless.”⁶¹ Other than forcing all of its members to sign the document, SAF has made no considerable effort so far, to include the guidelines and principles into its training, training manuals, or senior leadership policy statements.

¹Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, 17.

²The definition of a strategic corporal for purposes of this study comes from Major Lynda Liddy (Australian Army). “A strategic corporal is a soldier that possesses technical mastery in the skill of arms while being aware that his judgment, decision-making, and action can all have strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of a given mission and the reputation of his country”. Lynda Liddy, “The Strategic Corporal. Some requirements in education and training” *Australian Army Journal*, 2, no. 2:140, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf> (accessed 26 October 2011).

³Scott C. Farquhar, *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 107.

⁴The Iraq Army in 2003 did not offer organized resistance, which would seriously test the US combat power, resulting in unexpectedly quick initial invasion victory.

⁵Cohen, *Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces*, 6.

⁶Cook, *The Moral Warrior*, 146.

⁷Cohen, *Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces*, 9.

⁸The Pew Global Attitudes Survey, “25-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey,” [pewglobal.org](http://www.pewglobal.org), 2009, 22, <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/264.pdf> (accessed 26 October 2011).

⁹Cook, *The Moral Warrior*, ix.

¹⁰Cohen, *Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces*, 4.

¹¹Mark Mazzetti and Emily B. Hager, "Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater's Founder," *The New York Times*, Middle East, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?_r=1 (accessed 28 July 2011).

¹²Kaucic, *Ustava Republike Slovenije*.

¹³It is not specifically defined which alliance. NATO is the only military alliance Slovenia is currently a member of.

¹⁴Furlan et al., *Military Doctrine*, 24.

¹⁵Karba, "Naša Politika Je Za to, Da Bi Prišli v Nato, Obljubljala Preveč," 5.

¹⁶Cook, *The Moral Warrior*, 76.

¹⁷Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, 3, 4.

¹⁸Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC. *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms*, 7.

¹⁹Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians and How*, 20, 21.

²⁰Poles, "Koncept Vojaskega Izobraževanja Castnika Slovenske Vojske," 127.

²¹Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Strateski Pregled Obrambnega Resorja 2009*, 17.

²²Brozic and Susnik, "Evalvacija Izobraževalnega Procesa s Poudarkom Na Vojskih Vsebinah," 24, 25.

²³Tos, "Vojski Izobraževalni Sistem-Realnost Ali Muha Enodnevnica," 97.

²⁴Anton Zabkar and Uros Svete, "Solanje Vojskih Profesionalcev Med Tradicionalnimi Izhodisci in (Post) Modernimi Izzivi," 205-207.

²⁵Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff, *Program Stabnega Solanja Castnic in Castnikov Slovenske Vojske*, 12-14.

²⁶Jelusic, "Kaj Lahko Obramboslovje Prispeva k Povecanju Profesionalnosti Castnikov in Castnic Slovenske Vojske (Razprava)," 176; Zabkar, "Ahilova Peta Sistema Izobraževanja Castnikov (Razprava)," 134.

²⁷Jelusic, "Kaj Lahko Obramboslovje Prispeva k Povecanju Profesionalnosti Castnikov in Castnic Slovenske Vojske (Razprava)," 182.

²⁸Zabukovec, "Razvoj Nadaljnega Vojaskega Izobraževanja in Usposabljanja Castnikov Slovenske Vojske in Primerjava z Nekaterimi Tujimi Izkusnjami," 151-156.

²⁹Jelusic, “Kaj Lahko Obramboslovje Prispeva k Povecanju Profesionalnosti Castnikov in Castnic Slovenske Vojske (Razprava),” 177.

³⁰Kotnik-Dvojmoc, “Kaksen Naj Bo Sodobni Castnik Slovenske Vojske in Kako do Njega,” 87.

³¹Branimir Furlan, “Z izzivi novim izzivom naproti” [With challenges towards new challenges], Contemporary Military Challenges, Editorial, http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/uvodnik_izzivi.pdf (accessed 28 July 2011).

³²Traditional authors such as Huntington and Janowitz were arguing for complete subordination of the officer corps to the civilian leadership, meaning that once a political decision was made, the officer corps could not argue against it but had to execute it as it knew best.

³³Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations*, 154, 155.

³⁴Greg Jaffe and David Cloud, *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army* (New York: Crown Pub, 2009), 151-153, Kindle for iPad.

³⁵SJM. Public Opinion Research Center. Politbarometer 05/2011 (cjm.si), http://www.cjm.si/sites/cjm.si/files/file/raziskava_pb/pb_maj_2011.pdf (accessed 28 July 2011).

³⁶UPI.com. “Most Confident in Military,” *US News*, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/06/23/Poll-US-most-confident-in-military/UPI-93391308838856/ (accessed 28 July 2011).

³⁷Urednistvo maldine, *Peticija Ukinimo vojsko* [Petition for abolishing army], http://www.mladina.si/mladina_plus/peticije/ukiniti_vojsko/ (accessed 28 July 2010).

³⁸Tos et al., *Vrednote v Prehodu IV, Slovensko Javno Mnenje 2004-2008*, 376, 377.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 377.

⁴⁰Furlan, “Strateske Politicne Usmeritve Za Delovanje in Razvoj Slovenske Vojske,” 171, 172.

⁴¹In slovenian “Zveza Slovenskih Castnikov.”

⁴²Pierce, *Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?*, 8.

⁴³Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC. *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms*, 9.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁵Matthews and Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 167.

⁴⁶Jakic, "Vrednote in Zaznave Uresnichenosti Vojaskih Vrednot Pripadnikov Slovenske Vojske," 81.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 83.

⁴⁸Cohen, *Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces*, 21.

⁴⁹Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC. *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms*, 11.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²Slovenian language has a special form when addressing somebody one respects, has a position of authority, or an older generation. The form however is almost never used in conjunction with a person's given name, and almost exclusively with a person's last name. So when one starts using someone's first name without that special form, the relation of respect or authority is easily mistaken for one of friendship. One can see how this could cause problems in stressful situations.

⁵³Alenka Petek, "Profesionalna (Slovenska) Vojska?" [Professional (Slovenian) armed forces?], *Contemporary Military Challenges* 1999 year 13, no. 2 (June 2011), 91.

⁵⁴General Rudolf Maister-Vojanov (1874-1934); a military commander in the Austro-Hungarian military during WW I. At the end of the First World War he established the first Slovenian national military, defended the city of Maribor and the northern national border of Slovenia.

⁵⁵Furlan et al., *Military Doctrine*, 17.

⁵⁶Manica Jakic, Ljubica Jelusic, and Velko S. Rus, "Socialne Reprezentacije in Organizacijska Kultura v Slovenski Vojski" [Social representations and organizational culture in Slovenian armed forces] (Doctoral thesis, Faculty for Social Sciences, Ljubljana 2008), 145-147.

⁵⁷Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Pravilnik o Sluzbeni Ocen*i [Service member's evaluation report regulation], Ministry of Defense (Uradni list RS, št. 1/2010, Ljubljana, 2010), 211-216.

⁵⁸Jakic, Jelusic, and Rus, *Socialne Reprezentacije in Organizacijska Kultura v Slovenski Vojski*, 40.

⁵⁹Smerkolj, *Primerjalna Analiza Urejanja Sistema Plac Pripadnikov Obrambnih Sil*, 107, 108.

⁶⁰Government of the Republic of Slovenia, *Kodeks Vojaske Etike Slovenske Vojske* [Slovenian armed forces ethical code], 7650, 7651.

⁶¹Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, Combined Arms Center, TRADOC. *An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms*, 13.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter brings forth conclusions that will answer the primary research question. In the conclusion, it will answer what is the current state of SAOC professionalism, and recommendation for changes necessary in SAOC professionalism to allow it to be ready for future challenges.

Conclusions

Albert S. Britt establishes in his H100 reading *Offensive into Russia* “For the most part armies are a product of their most recent experience, especially if that experience includes victorious combat”¹ Slovenia is no exception. Especially since in the former Yugoslavia the military was seen as the main threat to the formation of an independent Slovenia. The latter proved to be correct since it was primarily the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and its professional officer corps that was determined to keep the country together by use of force if necessary. Much of the today’s formal relationship between the civil society and SAF could be explained by that experience. In 1991 the YPA, led by a professional officer corps, was defeated by primarily political means supported by what was a reserve armed force (Slovenian Territorial Defense Force) led by motivated civilians in uniform and not military professionals. The civil society and politics in Slovenia, in large part, still relates military professionalism to YPA officer corps and, therefore, does not want the SAOC to have a similar status as a matter of principle rather than as a result of a professional debate on the matter.

In addition, Slovenian political leadership primarily executes Huntington's subjective control over the military. As established above, the SAOC was, in part, unable to establish itself as a professional entity because the political leadership, based on historical experience, sees that as a possible threat. At the same time, the political leadership receives additional benefits from the lack of professionalism in SAF. As there is no immediate and direct military threat, the party in power can easily manipulate an unprofessional officer corps to its own interests and needs without any visible initial consequences to the public.

The lack of interest for a professional officer corps in the politics has two direct consequences. First is the lack of interest in SAOC for any kind of change. Since there was no professional officer corps to start with, the lack of an outside demand for it means the status of the officer corps is maintained where majority of the officers sees no need to change what has so far been good enough. Second is the confusion as to how exactly SAOC look like and what is expected of it. This leads to different, competing ideas as to how to develop SAOC. However, although Brigadier Furlan, in 2008, established the strategic national security documents are still somewhat uncoordinated², the latest 2009 and 2010 documents make a marked advantage in giving guidance to SAF and with it the guidance on how to develop the officer corps.

Although one can easily blame others for his problems, one must also look at what he himself can do to improve. As one looks at SAF the major deficiencies within it for developing professional officer corps come from the officer education system. Although the format of schools and the curriculum follow the trends in modern military, there are serious deficiencies in setting standards and having appropriate teaching faculty.

SAF TRADOC³ leadership continuously claims that the officer educational system is appropriate for the current state of affairs in the world, as well as comparable with the Allied nations. However, they fail to provide adequate data in support of it, despite constant warnings from defense experts at home and abroad. As the analysis here has shown, the available data does not concur with those claims.⁴

The statements of senior SAF leaders are indicative of the professionalism in SAF. For example, General Janez Slapar's (ret.)⁵ recommendation for a force of four thousand does not seem to have an expert debate supporting it. There are plans to reinstitute conscription in case of national emergency. The available information and principles of military training suggests that that would be almost impossible with a force of four thousand. There would simply not be enough cadres to train the conscripts, especially on short notice. Slovenia lacks strategic depth, there is nowhere for its forces to retreat, gain time, and buildup. Therefore, we can only see General Slapar's statement in the light of fulfilling international requirements and obligations, and not as a statement that would support the execution of the whole spectrum of operations entrusted to SAF by law.

Another of his statements is that SAF should be less like the U.S. Army in treating its soldiers. This shows a lack of understanding and knowledge about the state of affairs in both the SAF and the U.S. Army. His statement that "there are only three words, "Yes/No Sir," U.S. recruits are allowed to say in the first weeks of their service"⁶ is intended to show the lack of concern for soldiers wellbeing in the U.S. Army. Although the statement may be true, it is misleading. Personal observations from serving in various U.S. schools and spending considerable time with U.S. Army junior leaders, would

further suggest that it will take SAF a long time to show the same level of concern for soldiers' wellbeing and comprehensive care as it is the case with U.S. Army.

Another senior SAF leader Colonel Ivan Mikuz⁷, stated, "The defense of Slovenian territory is now also a part of alliance plans, as we are integrated into collective security system."⁸ Although serving only at the tactical levels (battalion and brigade) in SAF for the last ten years, I can say no such plans were ever presented, neither are the units in any way trained to execute them. It can also be deducted from the interview that SAF has no such plans of its own. One would expect the units to know their roles in such plans, and the leadership to be trained in their execution through Command Post Exercises. Within NATO alliance, each country is still responsible for its own defense, therefore it should have its own plans, which may or may not include alliance capabilities. Entrusting nations defense to a hypothetical alliance plan is at minimum unprofessional. In addition, the analysis of the articles published in the professional magazine *Bulletin of Slovenian Armed Forces* has clearly shown lack of discussion of tactical and technical matters concerning SAF operations at home and abroad.

The Slovenian public strongly opposes the SAF participation in combat operations abroad (Iraq and Afghanistan). It has clearly not yet accepted the expanded roles of an all-volunteer army and the coalition security concept. SAF leadership has clearly not been successful in explaining the new roles of the force to the public. Although SAF is ranked high compared to other government departments and agencies, the level of trust expressed is still low for a force that relies on volunteers to fill its ranks.

SAF Officer Corps lacks inner organization and professional culture. Much of it is due to the fact the members of SAF are by law public servants. Therefore, the same

standards of work, pay, and conduct apply to them. In essence, a SAF officer in the eyes of the law and the government is not much different to a clerk. SAOC is not allowed to police its own ranks, nor is it responsible to formulate its ethics. The government, in fact, prescribed the Code of Ethics for the SAF.

In addition, the extreme limitations on soldiers working time, in essence, force the officer corps to be unprofessional. The demands put on the officer corps to maintain the readiness of the units are “impossible to execute within the standards of professionalism expected of any modern military if they are to remain within the bounds of the law.” Professional culture among the SAOC is therefore “more that of a public employee-clerk than that of a military officer.”⁹

There are also clear signs of unprofessionalism in the artifacts representing SAF and its officer corps. The officer corps is responsible for establishing standards and ensuring they are enforced. SAF and with it SAOC has its values well defined. There are, however, serious discrepancies between those values and the values officers see as important.

In conclusion, SAF Officer Corps lacks in almost all elements of professionalism. The officer corps education has a good format but seems to be unable to produce technical and tactical experts. The level of trust between the officer corps, political leadership, and civil society is not satisfactory. The belief among the officer corps is not one of service but of being a public employee. The SAOC does not possess professional autonomy, nor does it have an inner organization that would allow one to develop. The lack of professional culture and ethics is a logical consequence of all the above factors.

SAOC cannot be considered a professional corps in accordance with modern standards. As such, it will have considerable difficulties in meeting the challenges the future brings.

Recommendations

For SAOC to become a professional corps capable of dealing with all the challenges the future holds several things need to happen.

1. The teaching faculty at military schools should be handpicked among the best SAF can provide. Only the best commanders should be offered a teaching position at one of the career development courses/schools. They should teach along with a complementary faculty of civilian experts in non-military specific subjects. The requirement to teach should be mandatory for all those pursuing a higher level of command in SAF. Therefore, at the officer school, NCO training cadre should be supplemented with the teaching staff of top company commanders. At the Staff Course (U.S. Captains Career Course equivalent) the teaching faculty should come from previous key development jobs at the brigade or higher staff (XO, S3 or G3, S2,G2). At the Higher Staff Course (U.S. Command and General Staff College equivalent) the teaching faculty should be previous top battalion commanders, and at the General Staff Course previous brigade commanders equivalent and higher. For each stage of SAF officer training and education, the appropriate entrance criteria for the teaching faculty must be formalized. With that, the focus of SAF educational system should be battalion and brigade level officers.

2. When deciding what subject to pursue in their master and doctor degrees, officers should be encouraged to select military sponsored subjects and thesis. This

would include international relations, history, culture, management, and other relevant subjects for current military operational environment. The key is for them to contribute to overall SAF capabilities development. If officers wish to pursue non-military sponsored subject, they should certainly be allowed to do so, but should at the same time be made clear to them, that their career path will be planned accordingly.

3. The SAF leadership has to introduce policy statements, doctrine, and manuals that will bring the desired culture and ethics into being. The practice of units using other military doctrinal and tactical manuals, which they are to reasonably adjust,¹⁰ must stop. The SAF TRADOC must revise and adapt those manuals to reflect the capabilities, structure, and missions of SAF. Training must constantly reinforce adherence to professional culture and ethics.

4. To assess individual officer's adherence to SAF values, the yearly officer evaluation report should be expanded and-or adjusted.¹¹ This would improve the knowledge of what exactly are SAF values among the SAOC, as well as contribute to the alignment of their personal values to SAF values.

SAF values should be reexamined to see if they actually align with the values in Slovenian society.

5. Communication with the civil society must be improved. SAF has to prove to the civil society it serves, that it provides an essential social function, even in a world where imminent threat to national territory is low. It should encourage and sponsor public debate on the role of SAF in the society, and provide expert knowledge to support its argument. The goal must be the level of public trust that is comparable to the one in the United States.

6. SAF members must be regulated and separate from public servants. Although there can be no denial that they are and remain in the service to the public, their working hours and standards of conduct cannot be the same. If one is to have a professional officer corps and with it professional military, the legislature must recognize that a military profession is more than 0730 to 1530 public service and demand from officers a 24/7 degree of responsibility and higher standards of conduct.

The issue of pay is inevitably going to be raised with this recommendation. There is no reason why the pay should be higher as it is within the existing system. Soldiers and with it the officers pay should be awarded with fixed benefits (service abroad, service in deployable units, separation allowance, and possible others) according to the duty he or she performs and not the hours he or she puts in. This would have positive consequences. Among others, it would lead to higher sense of social security and would allow officers to plan training and operations in accordance with professional standards.

The issue is not only the state of the SAF officer corps, but also the state of the entire SAF. As mentioned before the officer corps is the key to the military performance. An officer corps leads the military. A professional officer corps leads a professional military.

¹Albert S. Britt, "Offensive into Russia," *H100 Book of Readings* edited by Department of Military History (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, February 2011), 180.

²Furlan, "Strateske Politicne Usmeritve Za Delovanje in Razvoj Slovenske Vojske," 91.

³TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) in Slovenian is called PDRIU (Poveljstvo za Doktrino, Razvoj, Izobraževanje in Usposabljanje).

⁴The results of the article analysis in Slovenian Armed forces Bulletin conducted by the author, the results of the pools conducted by PhD. Liliana Brozic and PhD. Manica Jakic, and the article published by PhD Anton Zabkar and PhD. Uros Svete all discussed in detail in CH 4.

⁵General Janez Slapar was Chief of Territorial Defense Force Staff during the 1991 war for independence and de facto military leader during the war.

⁶Karba, "Nasa Politika je Zato da bi Prisli v NATO Obljubljala Prevec," 5.

⁷Colonel Ivan Mikuz is Chief of long-term planning section (J5) in SAF General Staff.

⁸Caharijas, "Pikrajsana Dvajsetletnica," 5.

⁹Alenka Petek, "Profesionalna (Slovenska) Vojska?" 91.

¹⁰SAF units are often authorised to use other military manuals in their training, planning and everyday work. With those manuals and even existing but outdated SAF manuals the usual accompanying TRADOC instruction is to »appropriately adjust« them.

¹¹Ministry of Defense, *Pravilnik o Sluzbeni Oceni*, 215, 216.

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